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*Assessing the Potential
for Using Reserves in
Operations Other
Than War*

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Carl Dahlman, Leslie Lewis*

National Defense Research Institute

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Preface

This report documents research and analysis into the potential to employ U.S. reserve components (RC) in overseas peacetime contingency operations—also referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The focus of the report is cast against the simple analytic framework of the demand (operational need) versus the supply (forces and capabilities) and the factors that integrate them. The report examines considerations inherent in the joint crisis action planning process that are used by the combatant commands; develops and analyzes criteria related to how forces are selected by force providers; and assesses the resource and institutional aspects of the Service cultures that decide when and how the RC are employed. The report considers the impact of demand on the use of reserves and illuminates a variety of practices that could impede the selection or use of the RC for contingencies. The report concludes with some recommendations to ameliorate potential impediments to RC use.

This research also included an examination of Army RC medical capabilities within the same contingency mission environment. See *Assessing the Use of Reserve Medical Forces in Operations Other Than War*, by Lois Davis, Gerard Hepler, and Roger Brown, RAND (forthcoming).

This research was conducted in the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. This research was sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs. The report will be of interest to the military departments, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and others concerned with national security policy and defense force structure analysis as it relates to overseas peacetime contingency operations.

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Summary

Background and Purpose

The end of the cold war and demise of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only superpower. Its new status conferred on it new responsibilities, including requirements to lead and participate in global operations that require military forces but do not involve armed conflict. Commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War or OOTW, these operations span a range of activities, including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping. The frequency and diversity of these operations have taxed the capacity of active component (AC) forces, and policymakers have looked to the reserve components (RC) both to lift some of the burden from the AC and to provide capabilities needed in OOTW.

This study analyzes how forces are selected for OOTW to determine how use of the RC may be affected. It examines not only formal force selection procedures, but also informal and potent influences that we call Service cultures.

Approach

OOTW can differ enormously across many dimensions. Few OOTW missions begin with the same objectives. Further, any given operation can change dramatically during its course in response to military or political considerations. Thus, to identify impediments common to many different operations requires a broad framework. Providing forces for OOTW can be thought of as a simple economic model using concepts of demand and supply. Setting OOTW in an economic framework, we identify three sets of influences on the decision to employ RC forces: processes, players, and factors.

The **processes** supporting operational decisions to employ forces are the mission planning process that determines the demand; the force selection process that identifies the sources of supply; and Service policies and cultures that define the environment for integrating the supply to meet the demand, particularly as it applies to the reserve components.

The **players** are the unified combatant commands that define the demand for an operation, the force providers that decide which forces to supply, and the

military departments that shape the environment in which the Services will use reserve forces.

Three major **factors** influence the decisions: operational, resource, and institutional. They are not unique to a single process or one of the players. These factors shape the tasks that determine the demand for forces and capabilities derived from the specific operational mission, affect aspects of the supply (the selection of forces), and reflect the effect of the Service cultures on the ultimate ability of forces to be selected and used.

Results

Selecting forces for operations is a complex activity. Although we can separate selection process into component parts to identify discrete influences, the process does not unfold in a clear, sequentially segmented manner.

What Affects Demand for RC Forces?

We examined the demand side of the equation by dissecting the mission planning process. Eight operational factors identified by the analysis commonly shape the demand for forces in OOTW:

- Task-resource requirements
- Scope of the operation
- Urgency
- Duration of operations
- Level of threat
- Level of control
- Treaty, policy, or mandate restrictions
- Involvement with nonmilitary organizations.

Most of these factors, by themselves, neither work for nor militate against selection of RC forces. However, three generally work against use of the RC: urgency, duration, and level of threat. An operation that requires a rapid response (hours or days), is short, or poses a high level of threat generally favors the use of AC units and tends to exclude RC. Other factors may work either way. For example, an operation may require a capability (a task-resource requirement) available only in the RC, or the terms of an international agreement (such as a

treaty restriction) may be such that only AC forces are feasible (e.g., level of training, time required).

What Affects Supply?

Two major influences affect the supply of forces: factors and Service cultures. **Institutional and resource factors** have potential for restricting the supply of RC forces because they affect the criteria planners use when identifying and selecting forces. We identified six criteria that providers use to select forces to meet the demand established in the mission planning process. These appear in Table S.1.

Force providers apply the criteria sequentially. Generally, if forces are available within the command and have the functional capabilities required, the command provides them. Or it can choose to purchase them, if a contractor can provide the capability. Because most active forces are assigned within the unified command structure and the commands look within their own structure first, AC units tend to supply most contingency demands.

As the search for forces moves outside the unified command structure, forces controlled by the military departments, including those in the RC, receive consideration. Again, availability and functional requirements play roles in the decision, but responsiveness and risk also factor into force selection, particularly for the RC. The political factor or perceived importance of the operation and public acceptance or support pertain almost exclusively to RC units. For an active unit, the perceived importance was established once the National Command Authorities (NCA) approved passing the mission to the commander-in-chief (CINC). If the Services are considering meeting the operational demand with RC volunteers, then the political factor weighs heavily.

Table S.1
Force Selection Decision Criteria

Demand Criteria	Explanation
Availability	No competing mission
Functional requirement	Can do what the operation requires
Responsiveness	Can meet deployment timeline
Level of risk	Likelihood of hostility and success
Political factor	Perceived national importance and public acceptance—the degrees to which national security is threatened and the public supports the military operation
Accessibility	What authority has been granted; what funds are available

Accessibility pertains only to RC forces and has two dimensions: authority and funding. If no presidential call-up authority has been issued, then use of RC forces will depend on volunteers, and for many peacetime operations, some Services, and some specific RC skills, the reliance on volunteers would limit access to RC capabilities. Conversely, granting call-up authority would ensure access, all other things being equal. Additional funding for peacetime employment of RC forces would also encourage their use; failure to provide it would have the opposite effect.

Considered in light of institutional and resource factors, most of the criteria favor the AC. Only in the case where the functional requirement does not draw on a capability unique to one of the components is the effect neutral.

Service Cultures

Service cultures are institutional relations that often have historical roots and that determine the particular assignments given to individuals and units within the Services. The basic characteristic that separates Services from each other is perhaps that the Army and the Marine Corps man, equip, and train *operational units*, whereas the Navy and the Air Force largely man and train on *weapons systems* or platforms. This difference leads the Army and the Marine Corps to plan primarily for mobilizing units and integrating them into larger force structures, such as the brigade- and division-sized units that constitute the basic fighting elements of the ground forces. Hence, the Army and the Marine Corps stress *unit integrity*, in peacetime as well as during operational deployments.

On the other hand, the Navy and the Air Force have great flexibility in combining weapons systems into force structures specially tailored to an operational commander's requirements, and therefore concentrate their planning on *weapons systems availability*, such as the sortie generation capability of a ship or an air wing or the ability of a platform to perform to its design capabilities. This leads the Navy and the Air Force to plan for guaranteeing that key platforms or *systems are adequately manned*.

Clearly, this characterization is an oversimplification. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have aviation units that share the qualities found in Air Force and Navy aviation units. The Air Force and the Navy have fighting units that function very much like ground forces in that unit integrity is a primary factor in determining mission effectiveness (e.g., Navy SEAL units). That said, the fundamental difference does exist and shapes the primary mobilization concept employed by each Service for its reserve component.

The **Army** relies on a basic system of postmobilization train-up time that saves considerable resources by not having all units fully resourced or trained in peacetime. The Army relies on its reserves to support active combat units, and has structured its Guard to contain largely combat units, the overwhelming majority of which will be used only in wars not currently included in contingency plans. The Army provides low levels of full-time support for its reserve elements and few resources for reserve support of active operations.

The **Navy** has a relatively small reserve component, and bases its mobilization concept primarily on individual augmentation of active units. It gives its reserve units sufficient resources to attain a high readiness standard in peacetime. The Navy also devotes significant resources to bringing reserve individuals on active duty in support roles.

The **Air Force** active and reserve forces are so highly integrated in both peacetime and wartime that the distinction between active and reserve often is virtually meaningless. The Air Force provides substantial resources for full-time support of reserve units, ensures that they are all at a high level of readiness, budgets for reserve support of active operations, and can integrate reserve units and individuals into all active operations apparently quite seamlessly.

The **Marine Corps** reserve component mirrors the active. It plans to mobilize its reserve only in a major contingency, primarily a major regional conflict (MRC).¹ Because the Marines aim to be ready for rapid deployment, both active and reserve units are resourced to high readiness standards in peacetime. The mobilization doctrine is based on unit augmentation, but units do not require long train-up times. While there is a large commitment of active duty personnel assigned to full-time support of reserve units, the Marines do not budget many resources for reserve support of active peacetime operations.

The sum effect of these cultural differences is that the Army has more impediments to the use of RC combat forces. The shift of so much support to the RC increases the likelihood of using RC support units. The Marine Corps is similar to the Army, but its willingness to use smaller units to augment its active force and the high level of peacetime support provided to the RC make their use more likely. Integrating individuals in units poses fewer challenges, so the Air Force and the Navy have the highest potential for drawing on their RC for peacetime operations.

¹Major regional conflicts are now known as major theater wars (MTWs) in a recent change in DoD terminology.

Recommendations

Our recommendations for removing impediments cluster in three areas: the planning process, the force selection process, and institutional, or cultural, considerations.

Recommended Changes to the Planning Process

- Structure the planning process so that it considers tasks well suited for the RC from the outset and challenges routine assumptions about RC responsiveness.
- Enhance staff interfaces to improve information flow about RC capabilities and accessibility.
- Increase the number of personnel knowledgeable about RC on planning staffs and ensure they are included in the planning process.
- Expand the deliberate planning process to include specific RC units in regional concept plans.

Recommended Changes to the Force Selection Process

- Link Service offices and mechanisms that provide funding and orders for RC volunteers.
- Establish a DoD-level personnel contingency account to pay for RC volunteers—these funds to be in addition to existing Service funds that support the programmed use of RC personnel to support active force operations.
- Identify, in advance, personnel and units with skills normally in high demand for peacetime contingency operations.
- Compare costs of similar RC and civilian contractor capabilities and provide policy guidance requiring cost as a specific consideration in the force selection process.

Recommended Institutional Changes

- Assign higher readiness levels to RC units with capabilities in high demand during peacetime contingency operations and provide the necessary additional resources.

- Increase full-time support for units often sought for contingency operations.
- Change existing mobilization priorities for use of RC volunteers and forces.

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This report could not have been prepared without the cooperation and involvement of the staffs of the U.S. regional combatant commands and their respective Service component commands. The authors are also grateful to the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for their support in gaining access to information throughout the Department of Defense. In particular, we thank Captain William DiFilippo, USNR, and Major General Robert Goodbary, USA, for their thoughtful assistance. Lieutenant Colonel Sam Graham, USMCR (assigned to the J-8 in the Joint Staff) provided us with valuable points of contact in each of the unified commands, simplifying the coordination of our research.

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The authors, of course, are completely responsible for any errors in the report or shortcomings in the research.

Glossary of Acronyms

AC	Active Component
ACC	Air Combat Command
ADSW	Active Duty for Special Work
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
ANG	Air National Guard
ARC	Air Reserve Component
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
AT	Annual Training
BUR	Bottom-Up Review
CAP	Crisis action planning
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA	Course of Action
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
EUCOM	European Command (U.S.)
FFG	Frigate
FFRDC	Federally Funded Research and Development Center
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field manual
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FTS	Full-Time Support
GTMO	Guantanamo
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentees
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JTF	Joint Task Force
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
MIUWU	Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Conflict (now called Major Theater War)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDRI	National Defense Research Institute
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OMO	Other Military Operations
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operational Order
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
RC	Reserve Component(s)
STRM	Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TTAD	Temporary Tours of Active Duty
UC	Unified Command
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAEUR	U.S. Army Europe
USAFE	U.S. Air Force Europe
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARCENT	U.S. Army Central Command
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, European Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command

USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNR	United States Navy Reserve
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

1. Introduction

Background

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union that signaled the end of the bipolar international strategic environment in place since the end of World War II affected U.S. national security strategy in several ways. Key among these was a one-third reduction in total military force structure, the increased strategic importance of U.S. capabilities to dominate potential major regional conflicts (MRCs),¹ and subsequently, the increased U.S. military involvement in missions that were short of armed conflicts between nations. The latter diverse missions included such activities as peace operations, disaster relief, and nation and humanitarian assistance. The U.S. position as the single dominant “superpower” increased the demand for its involvement in these international missions. As a result, the increasing operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for a diminishing active military force structure suggests a growing need for employment of reserve forces in these operations.

In October 1993, the Secretary of Defense completed a comprehensive review of defense strategy and requirements for the post-cold war era, called the “Bottom-Up Review” (BUR), which defined the strategy and objectives needed for the new national security environment. The BUR postulated the increased likelihood of U.S. military involvement in “peace enforcement and intervention operations,” which cover a diverse set of missions generally referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The BUR also recognized that the reduced size of the active component (AC) would increase reliance on reserve component (RC) forces and noted that reserves would be required to support, augment, reinforce, and backfill active forces engaged in contingency and OOTW missions.²

To assess the role of the reserve components in this new environment, RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) initiated a series of studies across the spectrum of missions that might employ the reserve components. It studied the size, composition, and mix of active and reserve forces required to execute a

¹Throughout this report, the use of the term major regional conflict (MRC), which reflects DoD terminology at the time of our research, is recognized as major theater war (MTW) in current terminology.

²Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Department of Defense, October 1993, pp. 1, 8, 9, 91.

military strategy that addressed two near-simultaneous MRCs in a study completed in 1992.³ Subsequently, NDRI analyzed the state and federal missions of the National Guard, which explored the use of reserves in U.S. domestic missions.⁴ The present study investigates missions that are lower on the conflict scale than major regional conflicts but still require military involvement overseas. Specifically, it addresses OOTW missions, and it completes the series.

Objective

The research reported in this report has three objectives. First, it explores the potential for using reserve component forces in OOTW on either a voluntary or involuntary basis. Second, it seeks to determine what might limit the use of the reserve components in such operations. Finally, given sufficient demand for forces, it offers recommendations designed to increase the likelihood of being able to use the reserves. Included as part of this third objective is an analysis of the planned functional mix of active and reserve forces to determine if alternative mixes or sources of capabilities would improve the capacity to carry out OOTW contingency missions.

Approach

This study builds on the previous RAND analyses, which were expanded by extensive interviews with the staffs of the U.S. unified combatant commanders, the many staffs of their respective Service component commands, the Joint Staff, and the staffs of the military departments. It reviews recent and historical mission involvements in OOTW by the United Nations and several of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy) with specific focus on the use of reserve forces. We also reviewed Department of Defense, Joint Staff, unified command, and military department policies, doctrine, and plans that were relevant to both OOTW and the use of reserve component forces, including their pay and accessibility.

We focused on those key factors that determine mission or task requirements for forces and capabilities, the decision process and the criteria for selecting the

³National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, RAND, MR-140-1-OSD, 1992.

⁴R. A. Brown, W. Fedorochko, Jr., and J. F. Schank, *Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard*, RAND, MR-557-OSD, 1995.

required forces, and the Service cultures that determine the existing and planned reserve institutions and their intended uses within the military departments.

Organization of the Report

The remainder of the report is organized into six additional sections.

Section 2 discusses the mission set for OOTW and describes the analytic framework for the study.

Section 3 discusses the joint planning process at the unified combatant command, develops key operational factors that shape OOTW contingencies, and identifies some common characteristics of recent peacetime contingency missions.

Section 4 reviews the organization for providing force capabilities to the unified commands that perform these OOTW contingency tasks and outlines the decision process and criteria used by “force providers” for selecting forces for assignment.

Section 5 discusses the diverse character of reserve cultures of the military Services including several comparative measures that illustrate varied philosophies for reliance on reserve forces, the basis for their functional mixes among active and reserve components, and doctrinal aspects affecting employment of the RC.

Section 6 examines the potential to improve joint OOTW response capabilities by considering alternative force mixes and capability sources such as civilian contract services.

Section 7 provides our conclusions and recommendations to remove or ameliorate impediments to the use of reserve components in OOTW.

2. Mission Scope and Analytic Approach

A large portion of this report discusses the factors that determine when and if the RC are employed in overseas peacetime contingency operations. Often these factors and their interrelationships are not well understood. Therefore, the report identifies these key factors, explains the complex nature of their interrelationships, analyzes their potential to impede selection and employment of the RC, and identifies areas where changes could be made to ameliorate these potential impediments.

This section discusses the origins and scope of the OOTW missions that we studied and describes in detail the analytic framework we devised to focus our research and analysis. We limited the operational spectrum to nondomestic peacetime contingency operations exclusive of major regional conflicts. The basis of the analytic framework is a simple economic model of demand versus supply. We add to that model the integrating factors that shape the decision whether to use RC forces.

Origins and Scope of Operations Other Than War

A review of the origins, evolution, and scope of contemporary OOTW missions is useful to a broader understanding of contingency missions. Historically, the definition of OOTW-type missions has been controversial. Other terms that have been used to refer to these types of missions include Other Military Operations (OMO), Operations Short of War, Crises and Lesser Conflicts, and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

In the mid-1980s, the term low-intensity conflict (LIC) emerged to identify those operations that did not fall under the general definitions of war and normal peacetime operations. LIC was defined as "a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states."¹ LIC missions often had regional and global security implications, as illustrated by the international impact of the

¹*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts*, FM 100-20, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, December 1990, p. 1-1.

Haiti mission. The use of the word “conflict” suggested LIC missions involved the use of combat forces, but that they were small, or “lesser” wars.²

In 1990, the Army and Air Force co-published a manual that identified the following common list of LIC missions:³

- Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Combating Terrorism
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Peacetime Contingency Operations, including but not limited to
 - Shows of Force and Demonstrations
 - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)
 - Strikes and Raids
 - Unconventional Warfare
 - Peacekeeping
 - Support for U.S. Civil Authorities.

Some LICs, however, include operations not involving conflict: disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and infrastructure development. To move away from the connotation of military combat, the term Operations Other Than War emerged in the early 1990s in response to the acknowledgment that OOTW is more inclusive than “lesser” wars.

In 1993, the Army revised Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, to identify OOTW missions. These included the LIC missions, added counterdrug operations, and fully recognized the nonconflict missions of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, arms control, and nation assistance. The Army doctrine states that OOTW mission may precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with war in the same theater.⁴ However, the list of missions is not definitive, as several clearly overlap in both character and included tasks. The utility of the OOTW mission listing lies principally in the recognition that OOTW constitute a portion of overall Army operations and should therefore be included in subsequent more-detailed operational doctrinal publications. Those missions included in OOTW are:⁵

²In the mid-1980s the Army, for instance, concluded that because LICs were “lesser” wars, if they planned and resourced for global war or major regional contingency operations, sufficient “robustness” would follow to fight any other type of lesser conflict.

³FM 100-20, p. 1.6.

⁴*Operations*, FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, p. 13-1.

⁵FM 100-5, pp. 13-4 to 13-8.

- Disaster Relief Operations
- Humanitarian Assistance Operations
- Peace Operations:
 - Peacekeeping
 - Peace Enforcement
- Nation Assistance Operations
- Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Support to Domestic Civil Authorities
- Security Assistance Operations
- Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Counter Terrorism Operations
- Show of Force
- Attacks and Raids
- Arms Control

The Joint Staff has modified the term OOTW to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). A recent Joint Staff publication refines many of the earlier-identified missions to reflect the increased U.S. involvement in OOTW-type missions. It also shows a broader perspective for various Service capabilities and includes such missions as enforcement of exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, and protection of shipping. The complete mission listing with similarities to Army FM 100-5 are shown in Figure 2.1.

Whereas the joint missions listed as MOOTW are more expansive, they are no more precise or definitive than those provided by other sources such as FM 100-5. For example, Humanitarian Assistance is listed as a separate mission from Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, yet the latter includes a submission category entitled Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, which is not discernible from the former mission. The utility of these mission definitions for determining requirements for forces and capabilities is often the subject of strong criticism from those who would benefit from doctrinal guidance in this area.

In an April 1995 letter from the United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) reporting review comments on the draft of Joint Publication 3-07 and another joint publication, the CINCEUR noted that OOTW missions encompass real operations and that the definition of war was not useful

RAND MR796-2.1

- ✓ • DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations
- ✓ • Disaster Relief Operations
- ✓ • Humanitarian Assistance
- ✓ • Show of Force Operations
- Enforcing Exclusion Zones
- ✓ • Peace Operations:
 - Peace Keeping
 - Peace Enforcement
- ✓ • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- ✓ • Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency
 - Security Assistance
 - Foreign Internal Defense
 - Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept
- ✓ • Military Support to Civil Authorities
- ✓ • Arms Control
- ✓ • Strikes and Raids
- ✓ • Combating Terrorism
- ✓ • Support to Insurgency
- Protection of Shipping
- Recovery Operations

KEY: ✓ = Agrees with Army FM 100-5

SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1995, pp. III-4 to III-8.

Figure 2.1—Joint Listing of Military Operations Other Than War Missions, Joint Pub 3-07

since most military operations seemed to be in the MOOTW category. The USCINCEUR argued that what is needed is improved crafting of operational and strategic planning, which “often include[s] interagency campaign plans and operations integrating multiple elements of national power by synchronizing the efforts of a variety of agencies.”⁶ The letter further illustrates the continuing debate surrounding how OOTW missions are classified and raises the more important question of the utility of mission definitions within the operational environment of the combatant commands. It also suggests that the operational environment is not one in which a single mission statement will determine the

⁶Letter, United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command, April 17, 1995.

operational concept, but rather the tasks required, both assigned and derived, from specific mission analysis.⁷

The recent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommended that the “Secretary of Defense should change DoD directives and planning guidance to acknowledge the value of peace operations, aligning them with contingency planning rather than as part of the general, all-inclusive category of OOTW, and assign them an appropriate priority.”⁸ The CORM also recommended, as further recognition of the importance of this selected set of OOTW-type missions, that there be specific training, equipping policies, and funding for peace operations.

It is logical to expect that with increasing U.S. experience in OOTW contingencies, the generic term for this group of operations and for the specific missions included will continue to evolve. However, we found little utility in defining these missions with any precision since the combatant commands must deal with specific tasks that apply to the operation at hand and determine the required forces and capabilities to meet them.

Assessment Is Focused on Peacetime Contingency Operations

The research team faced a challenge in evaluating specific OOTW missions because of the missions, broad characterizations and lack of precision. We addressed only those OOTW missions that were international in scope (i.e., nondomestic missions that occurred in theaters of operation outside the borders of the United States) and were linked to contingency or unplanned missions. Previous analyses have sufficiently addressed the role of the RC in domestic missions and MRCs.⁹

We also recognized the need to distinguish the focus of our OOTW study from routine operations the reserves have long conducted, often during their annual training (AT), as part of peacetime support missions.¹⁰ Our study focus is on

⁷CINC Letter, 1995.

⁸Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, 1995, p. 217.

⁹See National Defense Research Institute, 1992, and R. A. Brown et al., 1995.

¹⁰Peacetime support missions are generally routine, planned in advance, and if RC forces are involved, normally take place during their two-week annual training periods. Examples of these missions are nation assistance programs such as village vaccination and veterinary-care exercises conducted for U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in Central and South America, overseas deployment of engineering units to build schools, hospitals, bridges, and roads, and peacetime support missions such as military-to-military programs, counterdrug operations, and other overseas deployments to support routine active force operations and exercises. As an example of the latter, USEUCOM has used soldiers on their two week ATs to help prepare and ship ammunition no longer needed in theater stocks back to CONUS. Interviews and briefings at USSOUTHCOM, May 1995; USPACOM, May 1995; and USEUCOM, June 1995.

peacetime contingency missions for those operations not involving a major regional conflict that are conducted outside of the continental United States (CONUS).¹¹ Examples of peacetime contingency missions are natural disasters, international disputes among nations (such as the border disputes in the mid-1980s between Nicaragua and Costa Rica), or military intervention in response to a threat to the national security or the security of allies, friendly nations, or critical regions (e.g., Bosnia). RC involvement in peacetime contingency operations often goes beyond the two-week AT period, requiring the use of volunteers or a selected reserve call-up to support their extended duration. Table 2.1 provides recent examples of U.S. peacetime contingency operations.

The difficulty in assessing reserve force roles, even in the more narrowly defined area of peacetime contingency missions, is that no two operations are exactly alike, and missions change over time in response to operational and environmental changes. To facilitate an assessment of the operational demand, we determined that a common set of activities, or basic tasks, needed to be identified that were fundamental elements of the peacetime contingency missions regardless of how the missions might change. We decided that a set of common denominators could be found by focusing on the tasks associated with the performance of the peacetime contingency missions. We discuss these tasks and their operational relevance in more detail in Section 3.

Analytic Framework

Since the thrust of this analysis was to determine the potential for employment of the RC in OOTW contingency missions, any proposed analytic framework had to include those elements that affected the decision to use the RC. The staff interviews and literature reviews made it clear early on that many elements could affect these decisions. Thus, the analysis had to systematically capture these elements and their interrelationships in order to identify the encumbrances to the use of the RC and to recommend improvements. To accomplish this, we devised a multidimensional analytic framework that employs the basic economic model of demand versus supply and considers those environmental shaping factors that provide the background for integrating selected sources of supply to meet the operational demand.

¹¹Subsequent use of the term OOTW in this report is synonymous with “peacetime overseas contingency operation.”

Table 2.1
Examples of Recent U.S. Peacetime Contingency Operations

Date	Location	Code Name/Event/ or Organization	Nature of Operation
May 90–Jan 91	Liberia	Sharp Edge	Noncombatant evacuation (NEO)
Jan–Feb 91	Israel	Patriot Defender	Missile defense deployment
Apr 91–current	Turkey/N. Iraq	Provide Comfort	Kurdish refugee relief
May 91	Bangladesh	Sea Angel	Disaster relief
Jun 91	Philippines	Fiery Vigil	Disaster relief & evacuation
Sept 91	Zaire	Quick Lift	NEO
Sept 91	Haiti	Victor Squared	NEO
Oct 91	Cuba	Guantanamo (GTMO)	Haitian refugee relief
Feb 91	Former Soviet Union	Provide Hope (FSU)	Winter relief
Aug 92–Feb 93	Kenya and Somalia	Provide Relief	Refugee relief
Aug 92–current	Iraq	Southern Watch	Enforce no-fly zone
Aug 92	Angola	Provide Transition	Foreign internal defense (FID)
Aug–Sept 92	Guam	Typhoon Omar	Disaster relief
Nov 92	Bangladesh	Sea Angel II	Disaster relief
Dec 92–May 93	Somalia	Restore Hope	Relief & FID
Jan 93	Kwajalein Atoll	Provide Refuge	Disaster relief
Feb 93–current	Bosnia	Provide Promise	Medical support and relief
Sept 93	Haiti	JTF-120	Sea interdiction
Oct 93	Somalia	JTF-Somalia	Internal security
Jul–Oct 94	Rwanda/Zaire	Support Hope	Humanitarian relief
Dec 94–current	Macedonia	Able Sentry	Peacekeeping
Sept 94–current	Haiti	Restore Democracy	Nation assistance & FID
Dec 94–current	Bosnia	Joint Endeavor	Peace enforcement

SOURCES: Based in part on A. B. Siegel and S. M. Fabbri, *Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960–1993*, CNA 37 93-0007, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, September 1993; excerpts from *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993–1994, pp. 36, 37; and excerpts from USAREUR briefing: "USAREUR in the 90s: A New Focus," June 1995, slide 12.

We determined that the many things that influence the use of forces fall into three categories: players, processes, and factors. Figure 2.2 illustrates the framework. It should be recognized in advance that the factors may impact more than one set of players and processes. The next three sections of the report discuss the three categories that influence the demand and supply and how the categories interact.

Players

The players are the unified combatant commands that define the demand for an operation, the force providers that decide which forces to supply, and the




Figure 2.2—Analytic Framework

military departments that integrate the added Service demands by selecting and applying the appropriate reserve forces.

Processes

The processes supporting operational decisions are the mission planning process that determines the demand; the force selection decision process that determines the sources of supply; and Service policies and cultures that form the basis for integrating the supply, including the RC, to meet the demand.

Factors

Three major factors influence the decision: operational, resource, and institutional. They are not unique to a single process or one of the players. These factors shape the tasks that determine the demand for forces and capabilities derived from the specific operational mission, affect aspects of the supply (such as the selection of forces), and reflect the integrated effect of the Service cultures on the ultimate ability of RC forces to be selected and used.

Operational Factors. Operational factors define and shape the requirements identified from the combatant commander's concept of operation. We derived a set of common operational factors through our research of the planning processes and staff interviews at both the unified and component Service commands. Operational factors include the mission-task assignment guidance explicitly provided to the warfighting CINCs by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and aspects of the tasks derived from their associated concept of operations for specific OOTW contingencies that determine requirements for capabilities and forces. These operational factors also often reflect the cultural biases imbedded within the joint and Service doctrine applicable to OOTW contingencies. However, the specifics of these operational factors are uniquely established within the context of each operation without regard to the similarity of the type of OOTW mission. Operational factors directly influence the demand for forces and capabilities and indirectly affect the selection of needed forces. We discuss these factors in Section 3.

Resource Factors. The resource factors refer to the manner and the processes by which the Services receive their funding for OOTW contingency missions. Again, the processes and procedures vary from Service to Service. For instance, the Air Force's RCs are integrated with the active component as part of the total capability planned and used in both routine and contingency missions. Consequently, the Air Force resources their air reserves component (ARC) at a high level of readiness and provides much higher amounts of additional funding for the use of the ARC in peacetime support operations than do the other Services.¹² These resource factors affect considerations in the force selection process and the Service cultures discussed in Sections 4 and 5.

Institutional Factors. The institutional factors are the DoD and Service policies that determine access to and use of the RC. Since each military department and Service has a different set of policies that govern the use of their reserve components, any assessment must also consider the individual Service cultures and philosophies toward their respective RCs. Our research into these Service policies and the history of their respective utilizations suggests that each Service has its own separate, if not unique, cultural beliefs and values with regard to the reason for maintaining the RC and the manner in which reserves should be employed. The institutional factors affect both the cultural integration of the supply with the demand and the process for selection of the forces, the supply. These cultures are discussed in detail in Section 5 of this report.

¹²Official budget and execution funding data provided by the military departments on use of reserve component personnel during the periods FY 93-95.

3. Establishing the Demand: Planning at the Unified Commands

This section describes the joint planning process at the unified combatant commands that determines the key mission tasks that form the basis for deriving forces and capabilities needed to accomplish an OOTW mission. This process determines the demand dimension in our analytic framework and addresses the related times underlined in Figure 3.1.

The unified commander-in-chief develops an operational concept for a specific mission. From this concept, tasks are derived that allow identification of resource requirements needed to accomplish the specific mission objectives, support of the mission forces, and any related activities, such as necessary backfilling of units and personnel within CONUS or at overseas locations. We describe the joint planning process and develop a set of operational factors




Figure 3.1—Key Elements Determining Mission Tasks: The Demand

commonly used in peacetime contingency operations to shape the need for forces and capabilities. We also provide an abbreviated discussion of the RAND Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management architecture that assisted us in determining common operational tasks related to peacetime contingencies. We conclude with an assessment of force capabilities commonly used in these scenarios and the capabilities provided by each of the existing component force structures, active and reserve, that are relevant to the identified spectrum of peacetime contingency missions.

Participants in Mission Planning

Numerous people and organizations participate in the overall joint planning process, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, who together comprise the National Command Authorities; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); the regional unified commander-in-chief (CINC) designated to perform the mission; the supporting unified commands that provide forces, such as the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) that oversees CONUS-based joint forces, or supporting functions, such as strategic transportation from United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM); and the component Service commands of the supported and supporting CINCs that provide the forces.

The people and organizations listed above fall within the U.S. national security chain of command. If the OOTW mission involves a coalition of forces from different nations, U.S. organizations must interact with their counterparts from the other nations or with coalition organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, to conduct combined-level planning. Missions involving multiple nations and combined planning usually involve a more complicated planning process. Since the lines of authority are less clear, specific tasks normally must be assigned to individual countries, and coordination is more complex in both planning and execution. We will address the planning process within the U.S. military organization.

The Joint Planning Process

It is simplest to think of the planning process starting with a strategic assessment that causes a CINC to plan for a specific mission or the initiation of an event with national security implications that causes either a combatant command to submit a CINC Assessment of the event or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to issue a Warning Order to a CINC to develop courses of action. In both cases, with direction from the NCA and under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates the mission to

the appropriate regional unified commander-in-chief, termed the “supported CINC.” The Chairman also notifies various other CINCs of the mission tasking, directing them to assist and support the mission as required, and assigning them the role of “supporting CINC.” The supported CINC, usually with the assistance of assigned Service component commands, then initiates the planning process to develop a concept of operations and the related tasks that determine the forces needed to accomplish the mission.¹

The CINC designated to perform the mission develops courses of action through the joint operational planning process. This process is defined as: “A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish his mission.”² There are two separate planning processes, distinguished by the time available, outlined in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—deliberate or peacetime planning and time-sensitive or crisis action planning.³ As mentioned in the previous section, we address only peacetime contingency missions, which generally fall within the scope of crisis-action planning.

Deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future contingencies that are deemed important. Crisis action planning (CAP) is performed in response to specific events. Although the two planning processes parallel each other, crisis action planning usually covers a period of days compared with the approximately 18 months for the deliberate planning cycle. Also, “CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action, and communication of reports and recommendations from combatant commanders up to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and decisions from the NCA down to the combatant commanders.”⁴

In the best of situations, crisis action planning takes advantage of and builds upon plans developed during the deliberate planning process. That is, the output of the deliberate planning process is an input to the crisis action planning process. The deliberate plan (typically termed an operations plan [OPLAN] or a concept plan [CONPLAN]) may require modification to “fit” the specific crisis situation, but the time-sensitive nature of the crisis action planning process can

¹The Armed Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 1993, p. 6-3.

²The Joint Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) Joint Publication 0-2*.

³The Joint Staff, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*, Joint Publication 5-03 Series.

⁴The Armed Forces Staff College, 1993, p. 6-4.

greatly benefit from knowledge and information available from the deliberate process.

Until recently, deliberate plans were developed only for major regional conflicts (MRCs) that had little or nothing in common with OOTW. However, the most recent Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)⁵ has directed the unified commanders to develop deliberate plans for five types of OOTW missions:⁶

- Peace Enforcement,
- Peacekeeping,
- Counterdrug Operations,
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

Unfortunately, the JSCP says little about the use of RC forces in OOTW. The only mention is: "Plan for Reserve component (RC) forces to backfill (replace with similar capability) for overseas presence forces that are re-deployed to another region. Reserve component forces may also be required to backfill within CONUS."⁷

Crisis Action Planning

Crisis action planning is broken down into six phases:

- Phase I: Situation Development,
- Phase II: Crisis Assessment,
- Phase III: Course of Action Development,
- Phase IV: Course of Action Selection,
- Phase V: Execution Planning, and
- Phase VI: Execution.

⁵Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 96*: CJCSI 3110.01, March 1995, and *Supplemental Instruction to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 96; Military Operations Other Than War*, CJCSI 3110.14, October 13, 1995. The JSCP assigns specific missions and forces to each of the unified commands and directs planning requirements to support them.

⁶During our interviews with the planning staffs of the various theater CINCs, we found that the staffs were in the process of developing deliberate plans for the specified OOTW missions. As of this writing, no OOTW deliberate plans have been forwarded to the Joint Staff for approval.

⁷JSCP FY 96, Appendix A, Enclosure C, p. C-A-18.

Phase I recognizes an event has occurred that has national security implications and may require military involvement. During the crisis assessment (Phase II), the NCA and the JCS analyze the situation to determine if military intervention is needed. The responsible theater CINC is also observing and reporting on the situation and evaluating the disposition of the forces assigned to him. During this phase of the planning process, the Service component commands are evaluating their forces in light of the evolving situation.

With the first indications that the United States may respond to an evolving contingency, the CJCS issues a warning order to the appropriate CINCs tasking them to develop plans for accomplishing the mission. The supported unified commander develops several potential courses of action (COAs) considering the operational factors surrounding the assigned mission. The Joint Staff (JS) reviews these COAs and one of them, potentially with directed modifications, is approved by the NCA for detailed planning with the advice of the CJCS. Once the NCA selects a course of action, the CJCS issues either a planning or an alert order to the supported CINC, depending on the urgency of the situation, with direction to finalize the approved COA into an operational order (OPORD) to be published and circulated within the unified command and among all supporting commands. The final step in the process, which completes the planning, is an Execute Order from the NCA, which initiates the operation.

In developing alternative courses of action (Phase III), the CINC defines the generic types and quantities of forces needed to accomplish the mission. The courses of action he develops for each option typically differ by the level of risk in accomplishing the mission and to his forces. At this stage, the CINC may include an assessment of the need for reserve forces. Identification of the need for units or capabilities typically comes to the CINC from his component commands. The RC may be used because the reserves have the needed functional capabilities (as in civil affairs) or because active component units are committed to other missions and are not available.

The CINC is guided during the planning process by various inputs from the NCA and the CJCS. One of these inputs is the level of control the CINC has over the overall mission. In some cases, the United States assumes sole responsibility for planning and execution. In other cases, international alliances (such as the United Nations or NATO) or other countries may be involved. For these multinational missions, the U.S. commander may take the lead in planning and execution or may be subordinate to a commander from another country. The NCA and the CJCS may also delineate specific tasks to perform during the mission.

Other inputs to the CINC may restrict using specific units because of readiness concerns or other commitments, whether call-up authority for reserves is possible, and whether additional funding will be available.

The NCA and the CJCS typically do not specify the types of forces the CINC should use, but may restrict him from using certain forces. The Service forces and the components those forces will be drawn from usually come from decisions made within the structure of the individual military Services beginning with the CINC's assigned Service component commands. A unit may be restricted because it has participated in several recent missions (morale and readiness reasons), or a unit may be eliminated from selection because of prior assignment to a higher priority mission (such as an MRC), or evolving events with potential needs in other regions of the world.

Even during the time-restricted crisis action planning process, there is significant interchange of information among the various participants, particularly between the NCA/CJCS and the theater CINC. The CINC provides options and alternatives to the national and joint-level authorities, while they, in turn, provide guidance and directions to the CINC that help shape the ultimate mission execution plans. Information on mission objectives, force requirements and availability, and any constraints flow among the various CINCs, component commands, and Services.

The NCA and the CJCS can also send signals of their intentions to the unified commander and to the Services that can influence the ultimate selection of specific units. The two most important are the planning assumptions for the potential use of a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)⁸ and the availability of additional funding. Without the PSRC or other authority for involuntary mobilization, participation must be voluntary. Without additional funding for personnel, the Services may not be able to support the use of voluntary RC personnel and units or be forced to reprogram funding, which could significantly affect the training and readiness of other units.

In addition to the guidance from his superiors, the theater CINC considers a range of specific scenario-related elements when formulating his courses of action. These various operational factors help shape decisions about the types of forces that will be needed and, to some extent, about which, if any, units will come from the RC.

⁸PSRC is the authority granted the President to involuntarily call up reserve forces, not to exceed 200,000 personnel and for a maximum duration of 270 days. See Section 12304, Title 10, U.S. Code.

The output of the planning process is a list of tasks required to perform the mission, the forces needed to accomplish those tasks, an assessment of the capabilities available to the CINC within his theater, and what capabilities are required from sources outside the theater. Potential sources include active units from the CONUS or other theaters, units from the RC, other allied forces, or civilian contractor support. We next address the task identification process, the role of the operational factors, and the identification of available and needed capabilities.

Operational Factors for Planning Peacetime Contingency Operations

Early in the analysis, we concluded that common operational factors were critical in determining how operational planners defined and selected a concept of operations, determined tasks, and selected what capabilities would be used. These operational factors would identify impediments to RC use, but no single source identifies them all. The research team, therefore, developed a list drawn from reviews of documents covering scenario planning, examination of CINC operational plans for peacetime contingencies, and interviews with planners in the unified and component Service command planning offices. From this work, the team developed a draft list of common operational factors. The list was then reviewed, iterated, and changed based on subsequent interactions with the various command planning staffs and discussions with Service staffs. The following eight critical operational factors commonly considered in OOTW were identified:

- Task-resource requirements
- Scope of the operation
- Urgency
- Duration of operations
- Level of threat
- Level of control
- Treaty, policy, or mandate restrictions
- Involvement with nonmilitary organizations

We provide a detailed description of the above operational factors in the subsequent paragraphs.

Task-Resource Requirements

The performance of certain tasks may be linked to particular resources. Often these tasks are associated with specific requirements for forces and capabilities. The military Services have organized their forces in units that have standardized Service doctrinal capabilities. For example, a notional transportation unit has the personnel, equipment, and capacity to prepare and move a specified amount of weight and cubic feet of cargo over a specific distance, within a specified time, and can sustain operations for a specific duration within its normal resources. These unit capabilities are distinctly different in each of the military Services and may be specialized within a single Service, such as the Navy's Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units (MIUWU) that provide harbor security for ships and port facilities.

The distribution of force capabilities among the AC and RC varies among the Services. For example, the Army organizes its components by hierarchy and function. To illustrate, the U.S. Army Reserve is almost entirely composed of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units at echelons above division. These units include civil affairs, medical, maintenance, transportation, and logistics capabilities that are scarce in the active structure. The Army National Guard contains primarily combat forces, including divisions and brigades, and combat support units for echelons at corps and below that include field artillery, engineers, and aviation capabilities. The Marine Reserves, on the other hand, have the same type of units found in the active USMC, albeit at a ratio of about one reserve unit for three similar active units. The Naval Reserve organizes only about 25–30 percent of its manpower into equipped units, Seabees, aviation, and fleet ships, and the remainder exist to bring active crews and units to full wartime personnel operating levels. The Air Force has placed much of its lift, refuel, intercept, and support force in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), but only about one third of its fighter squadrons and very little of either the bomber and strategic missile structure. These differences indicate the significant variances in Service cultures that affect the selection and use of forces and are discussed in a later section.

Scope of the Operation

The scope of the operation defines the numbers and types of resources—units, equipment, personnel, etc.—necessary to execute the concept of operations. Given that the active force is only so large and that certain functional specialties often reside primarily in the RCs, many concepts of operations for peacetime contingencies must draw from several of the Services and their components.

Urgency

Certain types of missions require quick response. For example, disaster relief may necessitate that supplies and medical assistance be deployed and in country within 24 to 48 hours. The quick response requirement was demonstrated by USSOUTHCOM's response to the Colombian volcano disaster in 1986. How quickly a capability is needed shapes the demand function and may affect decisions on the use of the RC. For instance, in the Army and Marines, the AC is viewed as available on short notice, while the RC usually require some additional time for activation and predeployment activities.

Duration of Operations

Some peacetime contingency missions are short (several weeks to two or three months). Others may require substantially more time (six months to a year) or unified commanders may establish minimum tour lengths. In either case, the duration assumed in planning may shape the demand for forces by restricting consideration for using the RC for certain capabilities and providing added demand for others. For instance, laws and regulations limit the time a reservist can be on active duty for other than mobilizations; e.g., PSRC is limited to 270 days. Long operations, such as Provide Comfort, may require unit rotations or limit RC involvement. These utilization regulations and minimum tour lengths may influence whether RC individuals or units can be or would want to be used in peacetime contingency missions. For example, RC volunteers may find that minimum tours of four to six months adversely affect civilian employment. In contrast, the demand for RC units and the attractiveness for RC volunteers may be enhanced by the need to backfill certain active capabilities such as medical specialties in U.S. base hospitals that have been required to deploy their active elements.

Level of Threat

This characteristic considers the potential for conflict and the level of intensity that may be involved. It contributes to specific tasks and may be the sole basis for demanding certain capabilities. Clearly there are operations, like those in Bosnia, with organized and well-armed combatants that require a broad range of lethal offensive military capabilities to ensure the capacity to perform required tasks. In others, such as in Rwanda, the primary concern is defensive and requires only a small, unsophisticated self-protection element. In response to a given threat, the highest level of technological sophistication available is often

employed to reduce the risk to U.S. military personnel. In those cases where the latest technology is required, selection may be limited, since only active forces may be equipped with these capabilities.

Level of Control

In many peacetime contingency missions, the concept of operations specifies that the United States will be subordinate to other organizations, such as the United Nations or NATO. In these cases, the international agencies may influence the specific tasks and demands for forces in such a way as to limit RC participation. For instance, establishing a level of training or skill that might require lengthy predeployment training could limit use of RC units in some operations. On the other hand, international involvement generally requires an increased demand for linguists, which may be in scarce supply in the active component.

Treaty, Policy, or Mandate Restrictions

Some peacetime contingency operations are governed by specific international treaties, formal agreements, or mandates that may dictate the use or exclusion of certain types of forces. Further, domestic policies may define how the mission is to be executed. These may also shape demand in ways that limit the selection of forces either directly or indirectly. A recent example is the Middle East Observer Force supplied by the United States for peacekeeping in the Sinai. The treaty and mandate specify the size of the force and the duration between rotations. With a six-month tour for a battalion-sized force, units would need to be activated well in advance and probably require 10–12 months on active duty. While this could be accomplished by volunteer personnel, as recently demonstrated, it requires lengthy planning and preparation that do not lend themselves to a contingency environment.

Interactions Within Nonmilitary Organizations and Agencies

Many concepts of peacetime contingency operations require extensive interagency interactions. Often these agencies are private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and the World Food Program. Involvement of these types of organizations in, say, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance may be critical to the success of the military operation. The need for successful interactions frequently influences the types of functional capabilities (type unit) needed to perform certain tasks; for instance, in many such disaster relief

operations there is a high demand for civil affairs specialists, who reside primarily within the Army reserve component.

Planning Process for Developing Operational Concepts

We next discuss the process for developing operational tasks that support a selected concept of operations and subsequently lead to specific force and capability needs. Figure 3.2 illustrates the integration of key considerations: those explicitly stated in external guidance (A), implicitly derived from operational factors (B), and directly related to the combatant commander's concept of operation for a specific peacetime contingency scenario (C). These considerations are integrated to provide the output of requirements, including task lists (D), which will be discussed in the next section. The explicit and implicit demands are integrated into the operational concept and subsequently developed into requirements and key tasks that can be directly related to Service capabilities and doctrinal forces. These needs are then identified and integrated into the operations plan. Finally, the requirements and tasks are allocated to the




Figure 3.2—Considerations to Determine Force and Capability Needs

appropriate force providers, usually Service component and supporting combatant commands, to determine force availability and to select specific forces for assignment.

The Service component commands often are responsible for associating the planning tasks and capability requirements in the evolving operations plan with specific Service units. Planners at both the unified and component commands have access to a number of reference tools derived from Service doctrine that assist in specifying units to match tasks or capability requirements. The result of their planning efforts is a list of units, usually designated by Service and standard doctrinal type and organizational level, required to execute the assigned operation. With this force requirement established, the Service component commands can start determining specific unit matches with assigned forces. This process is subject to a number of other important consideration criteria.

Identifying Required Tasks

Once the CINC has completed the concept of operations, the next step is to develop courses of action that define the tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. As discussed previously, the names or titles given to various OOTW missions (such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance) are not sufficient to inform the planning process. The important aspects are the stated and implied tasks that translate the concept of operations into definitive actions.

A set of common denominators was found by focusing on the tasks associated with the peacetime contingency missions. Identifying a set of common tasks allows us to determine where the capabilities reside in the force structure to meet the demands, a necessary step before recommending any shifts of capability. The hierarchical structure for the operational tasks was adopted from the Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) methodology. The STRM framework, developed at RAND during the late 1980s, is used by several DoD organizations.⁹ The framework is a decision support process for the planning and programming phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). It provides decisionmakers with an end-to-end concept of operations. If

⁹The original methodology was developed by Glenn A. Kent. It has been expanded to be called Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management, and more recently, Objectives-Based Planning. The Joint Staff, USSOCOM, US Forces Korea (USFK), and elements of the Army and Air Force staffs use various forms of STRM or Objectives-Based Planning methodology. Each change to the methodology has reflected further modification and expansion of the original framework. See: Glenn Kent, *A Framework for Defense Planning*, RAND, R-3721-AF/OSD, August 1989; Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, and C. Robert Roll, *The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework*, RAND, MR-445-A/SOCOM, 1994.

used correctly, it links resource decisions to specific military tasks that require resources, which in turn are linked hierarchically to higher-level operational and national security objectives. The framework establishes the downward connection from the strategies to tasks and programs as well as the upward connection from programs and tasks up through objectives to strategies.

Alternative concepts of operations with different tasks establish the demand for specific capabilities necessary to support it. Any operational concept, therefore, must consider the scope of the activity and the operational timelines (when and how long), since available resources are limited. The mission environment also has several attributes that shape the operational concept, including location, terrain, weather, and climate.

The demand for capabilities is shaped by the specific scenario in which the operations occur. Still, if a common set of tasks exists, it should be apparent across very different scenarios. Somalia and Bosnia have quite different scenarios, but several similar tasks were required in both. Examples of common joint tasks found within these peacetime contingencies are summarized below:

- Conduct reconnaissance and establish observation posts
- Provide security of airports and seaports
- Conduct convoy escort
- Construct roads and bridges
- Secure distribution facilities
- Establish movement control through checkpoints
- Conduct security patrols
- Suppress bandits
- Provide fire support
- Conduct heliborne assaults
- Conduct cordon and search operations in urban areas
- Search for and seize weapons caches
- Confiscate unauthorized weapons
- Render humanitarian assistance
- Assist reconstitution of civil infrastructure
- Provide medical, logistical, and other support to the deployed force.

Based on the scenario and concept of operations, the related tasks establish the demand for capabilities (in our simple model, capabilities are the supply that

responds to the demand). A number of considerations and constraints shape the selection of these capabilities, and more specifically the units, for peacetime contingencies. The commonality of organization, design, and doctrine within each of the military Services for both active and reserve units ensures that, with the provision of appropriate resources, equipment, personnel, and training, there is no practical difference in unit capability between the components. The combatant commands use these Service capabilities in the form of standard units, without regard to component, to match the demand of each operational task. We discuss how the specific units are selected in Section 4.

To identify the supply of many of the capabilities commonly needed in peacetime contingencies, we assessed the projected FY 97 force structure against these tasks and needed capabilities. We found that the RC have the preponderance of forces and capabilities to perform a number of tasks across selected OOTW mission areas. Figure 3.3 is our assessment of the force structure capabilities available to perform some of the current tasks observed within our defined scope of peacetime contingency operations. Those tasks for which the preponderance of forces are structured in the RC are represented by the dark check, and those with the preponderance of forces structured in the AC are indicated by the light "X". Since the RC normally have the full spectrum of

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Mission: Task/ Capability:	Disaster Relief	Human Assist	Peace Opsn	Nation Assist	Counter Drug	Counter Insurgency	Security Assist
Air Interdiction			X		X	X	
Air Recon & Surv			✓		✓	✓	
Aviation	X	X	X	X		X	X TT
Civil Affairs	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓ TT
Close Air Support			X			X	X TT
Combat Maneuver	X	X	X	X	X	X	X TT
Engineer	✓	✓	✓	✓			X TT
Intelligence			X		X	X	X TT
Language	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Logistics	✓	✓	✓	✓			X TT
Medical	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Military Police			✓	✓			X TT
Naval Blockade			X		X	X	
Port Opsn & MIUW	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓ TT
Power Production	X	X		X			
Psyops				✓		✓	
Public Affairs	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Special Operations			X	X	X	X	X TT
Transportation	X	X	X	X			X TT
Water Production	X	X	X	X			

KEY:  = Majority in RC,  = Majority in AC but also in RC,  = Training Teams

Figure 3.3—Sample of Current Tasks Performed in Peacetime Contingency Missions Showing Force Structure Mix (AC/RC)

capabilities extant in the active force, they can also be expected to augment, reinforce, and backfill the active in those categories where the AC has the preponderance of forces.

Assessment of Potential Operational Impediments to Use

In assessing the potential of the eight operational factors for impeding the use of the reserve components, we find that the factors fall into two assessment categories: those that seem to carry a inherent bias against RC use and those that can influence their use. The latter factors can work against the use of the reserves depending on the situation or their interaction with other factors.

Three factors seem inherently to impede the use of the RC: urgency, duration, and level of threat. Urgency, which in peacetime contingencies often requires a quick response time for forces involved, usually favors the use of active forces. In those RC with units that receive high peacetime resourcing and require little predeployment preparation, urgency has little effect.

Duration of the operation becomes a factor in planning if it assumes that the involvement will be short. In this case, there is usually insufficient time or force demand to require use of reserves. With longer operations, the potential for use of reserves may be increased if there are opportunities to rotate forces, as was seen in Haiti. Often this is not determined until the operation is well under way.

A high level of threat in a peacetime contingency usually favors the employment of active forces, especially when sophisticated U.S. combat capabilities are to be employed. The more modern and sophisticated combat capabilities and equipment are most often found within the active forces. Bosnia offers some evidence of this effect in that Army, Navy, and Marine Corps combat elements are active, whereas supporting units, especially outside of the zone of contact, include some reserves. In some instances, the Air Force exhibits a more integrated force that has employed combat elements from both active and reserve components with equal or compatible capabilities.

Other operational factors have the potential to impede the use of the RC, but they vary in their effect. The tasks-resource requirements factor may demand a capability only available in the RC. In those cases where the capability is in both active and reserve components, this factor seems unbiased. The scope of the operation has a similar effect in that an operation of large scope may by its nature provide an increased demand that exceeds the available supply of active forces and thus enhances the chance for RC employment. Treaty and policy restrictions

and level of control, while having some possibilities for impeding the use of RC, are generally neutral. Next, the potential for interaction with nonmilitary organizations, such as NGOs and PVOs, probably favors using RC capabilities, but this preference results from where the civil affairs forces are within the force mix. Finally, the almost unique interaction of any number of these factors may limit or enhance the use of RC forces in a specific operation.

4. Determining the Supply: Organization and Process for Providing Forces

This section discusses the second set of dimensions that determine the sources of supply in our analytic framework: the force providers, the force selection decision process, the determination of the supply, and the related factors as indicated by the underlined items in Figure 4.1.

Here we review the organization for providing force capabilities to the unified commands. We then define the criteria used by force providers for selecting forces for assignment to peacetime contingency tasks. We describe how the criteria are used in the decision process, and discuss the key factors that could affect force selection and their potential to affect the selection of reserve component forces. We also summarize the role of the military departments in establishing policy and procedures for accessing their reserves in support of the




Figure 4.1—Force Selection Decision Process: Determining the Supply


decision process. Finally, we summarize our research into how some Western foreign countries use their reserves in OOTW.

Organization for Providing Force Capabilities

With enactment of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all combatant forces were assigned to the joint combatant commands except those specifically exempted to fulfill the functional roles assigned by law to the Services to “man, train, equip, supply, support.” For the most part, these military forces remained under the control of the respective Service component commands within their assigned combatant unified command. The allocation of forces among the unified commands is directly related to assigned missions and responsibilities conveyed in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and other direction from the NCA. Initially, the force providers under this new scheme were usually the component commands assigned to a given combatant command. When additional forces were required, the supported combatant command obtained reinforcements and other capabilities from designated supporting combatant commands. Functional combatant commands, such as USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM, provide the supported CINC with the required special operations forces and lift capabilities, respectively. Reserve forces not mobilized or otherwise already assigned to combatant commands remained under the control of the military departments. Figure 4.2 illustrates this complex joint command and military department organization.

The reduction of forces after the cold war and subsequent basing of a majority of the forces in the continental United States led the NCA to assign to USACOM the mission of joint force integrator responsible for deploying most CONUS-based forces to the other regional combatant commands. This UCP-assigned mission was consistent with the law and brought joint force operational planning within a single major combatant command. Where assigned missions and tasks required capabilities or forces from the reserve components, the Service component commands and military departments coordinated to obtain those forces for eventual assignment to the supported combatant command.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the organizations involved in providing forces for operational missions. The process has both formal and informal aspects. In the formal system, the requests for forces and capabilities follow the lines of established responsibility, with the Joint Staff assisting the supported combatant command in coordination. It might appear that until a formal request for



NOTE: It should be recognized that all unified commands may perform the role as force providers when directed to perform as supporting unified commands. We have highlighted the special roles played by USACOM and USSOCOM for emphasis. Our use of the term "force provider" is to focus on that specific function shared by unified commands, military departments, and Service component commands.

Figure 4.2—Joint Organizational Architecture for Providing Forces

resources was received nothing would be done in anticipation of providing support. In reality, many of these organizations maintain open communications and informal coordination that precede most formal requests. In particular, the Service component commands usually anticipate potential requests and informally involve the military department staffs early in force planning. The process of force selection considers a number of common criteria.

Criteria Used by Force Providers to Select Forces

After inquiring into the criteria for selecting forces to meet operational requirements, we iterated the responses with each subsequent set of staffs and refined the list into key criteria. We then established how the criteria were related and determined an iterative hierarchical order for their use. Finally, we organized the criteria into five decision steps that are applied partially or fully by

the force providers for any operation. Figure 4.3 displays the resulting order and criteria for selecting the required forces.¹

Availability addresses the status of a specific unit with regard to assigned operational responsibilities for a specific operation and considers competing operational demands. The availability of a unit may be established by external direction that specifies its assignment to a high-priority mission such as an OPLAN for a MRC that denies the use of that unit for other contingencies. Availability may also be determined by the owning command because of activities in process, such as the receipt of and training on new equipment, which may temporarily keep the unit from participating in operations until completion and certification of operational readiness. Relative priority for specific operations, as it affects availability, can be decided at the NCA, supported unified command, supporting command, military department, or a combination of these agencies. The hierarchical nature of these agencies and

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- ①
 - Availability (competing missions for forces)
 - Functional requirements (forces and capabilities)
- ②
 - Responsiveness (lead, planning, and reaction time)
 - Level of risk (hostilities and assurance of success)
- ③
 - Political factor (national importance & public acceptance)
 - Accessibility:
 - ④ – Authority (volunteers, PSRC, partial mobilization, etc.)
 - ⑤ – Funding (TTAD, ADSW [active duty for special work], AT, active military pay, etc.)

KEY: ① = Decision step • = Criterion

SOURCES: Unified command, component command and Service planners.

Figure 4.3—Force Provider Decision Criteria for the Selection of Forces

¹These decision criteria and the decision process that describes their application represent the composite analysis of inputs from many sources including staff interviews, reviews of planning procedures, and examination of past operations among the regional unified commands and most of their force providers. We also examined the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and other joint and Service doctrinal literature for discussions of their respective force selection processes. This list of criteria and the hierarchical decision process are provided as our generic representation of what actually happens in the force selection process across the full spectrum of force providers. They are not intended to replicate the specific policies or procedures of any individual Service or command.

their authority to assign units to operations tend to favor precluding a unit's availability rather than unilaterally ensuring that a unit is available for assignment in a contingency.

Functional requirements are the capability needs determined directly from the task lists that support the CINC's concept of operation. These task lists are most often responded to by planners at the Service component commands in the form of the types of units that possess the required functional capabilities. For example, requirements for a forced-entry capability might be met through the selection of parachute assault, amphibious assault, or special forces insertion units depending on the operational concept. In other cases, usually where risk is not a major concern, the needed capabilities might be obtained from commercial sources.

Responsiveness addresses the capability of forces to meet the schedule for deployment and employment of forces. The schedule may prohibit the use of some units because of their current employment or readiness status. In the case of reserve units or individuals, the time required to select, notify, mobilize, and prepare forces may restrict their use in some operations.

Level of risk addresses the level of risk to participants and to the success of the operation. In the first case, where hostilities are expected, the demands for units with high readiness and extensive training become greater. In the latter, the demand increases for more experienced units and individuals so as to raise assurance of expected levels of performance. Both aspects of risk seem to be explicitly measured at the supported command but are only implicitly used in the selection of forces. However, both aspects of this factor often favor the use of active component forces.

Political factor includes the national importance of the mission and public acceptance, which are normally implicit factors for most actors in the decision process. Once a mission has been assigned, military importance is established and those responsible for planning and execution pay little regard to the public's level of acceptance. However, when reserves are considered, these two factors weigh heavily on both the methods for accessing and the expected response. If the operational need is not viewed by the public or Congress as being in the national interest and lacks support, it is not likely that the operation will rely on volunteer reservists. Further, planners may press for use of involuntary call-up authority to ensure early on that needed reserve capabilities will be available.

Accessibility of reserves has two principal components:

Authority to access units or individuals of the reserve components is legally assigned to the secretaries of the military departments by the NCA. In cases where units are to be accessed involuntarily, regardless of the specific authority used, the Services develop lists of units that meet operational and functional requirements and their mobilization is approved by their secretary. In the case of accessing individual volunteers, the process involves many levels of organization below the military department to assist in identifying available reservists who would volunteer for service and obtaining appropriate orders for volunteer activation.

Funding for volunteers differs in each of the military departments but is an essential element that must be obtained concomitantly with the selection and activation of reserve volunteers. Funding for reservists supporting active operations is scarce under normal peacetime conditions in most Service budgets except for the Air Force, which has budgeted far more than the total of the other three Services as a result of its history of reliance and use of the ARC in peacetime. Thus, contingencies usually require reprogramming of funds or requested supplemental appropriations from Congress. Reprogramming is often constrained and is not compatible with rapid execution. Obtaining supplemental appropriations is often time consuming, which places dependence on Service reprogramming of existing funds to support execution of contingency operations. However, reprogramming is not easy and may be disruptive of other operations. Delays in completing reprogramming have affected timely accession of RC volunteers in some of the Services.

Decision Process for Selecting Forces

We arrayed the force selection criteria hierarchically in Figure 4.4 to illustrate the ordered decision process as derived from our interviews and discussions at the several regional unified commands. Repeated criteria are indicated by the numbers in the decision block.

Within the supported combatant command assigned the peacetime contingency operation, the criteria of availability and functional requirements are applied to their assigned forces. The command can also select nonmilitary, contracted civilian capabilities if they conform to the CINC's operational concept. Where assigned forces or nonmilitary capabilities meet the criteria, the operational requirements are fulfilled and the remaining criteria are not required. When the supported combatant command is not able to meet force requirements, the unfulfilled portion of the force list is transmitted to other supporting CINCs with coordination through the Joint Staff. Those designated supporting commands,




Figure 4.4—Hierarchical Ordered Force Selection Decision Process

for example, one or more of the functional unified commands such as USTRANSCOM, or one or more of the other regional combatant commands, may be required to provide strategic lift or forces. As portions of the unfulfilled force list are assigned to these force providers, the supporting commands and their Service component commands follow essentially the same force selection decision process.

Force providers external to the supported combatant command must first determine if they have available forces that can meet the needs on the operational force list. Since most active force units are assigned within the unified command structure and the remaining active and reserve component units are retained by the military departments, most contingency force requirements are met by active units.

Responsiveness may force selection of active units if only they can meet required deployment times. Active units not immediately available may be available by the required deployment times. Further, the level of risk may be so high that it limits force selection to active forces that are at higher levels of readiness and

possess more modern materiel. If active units are not available within the joint command force provider structure, capabilities and units may lie in the RC of the military departments. The responsiveness of the RC vary by Service, unit size, and function or skill—from hours in the Air Force to several days and months in the Army.

The reserve components are generally accessed by their respective military departments with recommendations for specific units from the active component command that has responsibility for their training and readiness. The military departments also use the criteria in the force selection decision process. What units possessing the required functional capabilities are available? Can they meet required response times, and are they prepared and trained for employment under the estimated conditions of risk? Once these criteria are applied, a list of possible units that match the operational force lists is compiled. At this step, the accessibility criteria for the RC become important. Will authority for involuntary unit or individual call-up to active duty, most likely under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority to bring reserves on duty for a maximum of 270 days, be supported by the NCA? Alternatively, will the supported combatant command be required to rely solely on volunteer individuals or units? If volunteers are to be the choice, the decision tree extends with the question: is there adequate funding to sustain the required lengths of active duty in the OPLAN? Once these criteria have been met, units and individuals from the RC will have been selected for activation.

The force selection decision process encompasses all the pertinent criteria used at multiple levels of organization in obtaining required forces to support a contingency operation. At each level in the selection of forces, the use of the criteria or the weights assigned to them may change significantly. For example, the component commands of the supported combatant command assigned an operation may give little or no weight to the perceived importance of public support associated with the operation and may not consider either the authority or the funding aspect of reserve accessibility. However, these same criteria may be of major importance at the Service commands that match the operational needs with RC units and volunteers. Some of the criteria, such as availability, seem to be used at each organizational level and may be universal, whereas others, such as accessibility, are considered only when reserves are required. Used in the form described above, these criteria seem applicable to the full range of OOTW contingency operations.

Using the Decision Process to Identify Impediments to Use

The practical value of this ordered decision process is that it forms a basis for identifying and evaluating possible impediments to the selection of RC forces and allowing for them in the planning process for OOTW contingency operations. The unified commands or joint task forces establish requirements for forces but do not specify which components will provide the required units. That falls to the various force provider commands. The military departments which have the legal authority to call up the RC for contingency missions.

The Critical Role of the Military Departments

Policy research and interviews with staff at the military departments reveal both the important role played by the departments in the selection of forces for peacetime contingency operations and the major impact of Service cultural aspects on these decisions. The military departments obtain recommendations from their internal command structures on the readiness of specific units to meet assigned operational requirements. The military departments know the status, including current capabilities and shortcomings, of their respective units. Selecting which unit is the most capable to perform an operational need seems best accomplished within their organization. However, beyond unit readiness status, Service cultures often decide the units selected for various missions. We will discuss Service cultures in the next section.

Use of Reserves in Units Versus Individual Volunteers

The final criteria of the force selection decision process, accessibility and its included elements of authority and funding, are directly related to the key decision to call reserve elements to duty involuntarily or to seek volunteers. In those cases where the NCA has decided to call up RC units involuntarily, either *a priori* or based upon force needs, accessibility is no longer a consideration. Under PSRC or various states of mobilization, it is only the statutory limits of authority that need be considered, such as duration of call-up. Funding can come only from active force resources; any reprogramming of funds or requests for supplemental appropriations from Congress are not operational concerns. Hence, involuntary RC call-up simplifies the decision tree by obviating the need to consider accessibility.

Accessing RC units or individuals voluntarily requires consideration of both the authority and funding criteria. A decision not to call elements involuntarily

when RC capabilities are required to support an operational mission increases the complexity of the force selection process. First, the volunteer assets—individuals or units—must be identified to match the operational needs. Next, the appropriate military department authority to access these volunteers must be obtained. Then, the military department and often several of its subordinate commands must identify and allocate the proper funds (pay, per diem, travel, etc.) to support the volunteer RC elements. Our research found many anecdotal instances over the past few years where attempts to access available volunteers were either impeded or unsuccessful because of delays in obtaining authority and funding or the inability to find sources of funding for volunteer reservists.

Formal and Informal Aspects of the Decision Process

Having described the force selection decision process and the application of its criteria at various levels, we endeavored to obtain a broad sampling from within several of the regional unified commands, their respective Service component commands, and the Services as to the specific impediments to RC selection that might exist when applying this process. We found formal documentation to support only a few individual force selection decisions. We attribute this lack of documentation to two circumstances. First, only some of the recent OOTW contingency operations have used elements of all the Service reserve components, and second, most of the decision criteria, while acknowledged as applicable, are informally applied by planning staff without an audit trail for their rationale or decisions.

As a result, we resorted to reviewing anecdotal reports and staff opinions to determine the impact of these criteria on past operations and to postulate their potential for future operations. One such example was the planning for “Operation Uphold Democracy” forces for Haiti. Plans called for significant numbers of civil affairs personnel, beyond those available in the single active unit, which necessitated the need for Army reserves. Initially, plans were based upon volunteers to fill this need; USACOM assumed that PSRC would not be needed or provided. However, informal feedback from the Army Reserve Command indicated that the required civil affairs units and skills could only be ensured through an involuntary call-up. Subsequently, U.S. Army Forces Command and USACOM staff planners provided this information to the Department of the Army and the Joint Staff, where the decision was made to request the President to authorize a limited call-up under the PSRC authority. This request was approved and the needed civil affairs capabilities and personnel were activated to support the operation. This example also highlights the lack of

available empirical observations to support a detailed analysis of this process and the application of the criteria.²

Insights into the Process of Selecting Forces

Our research into the decision process of force selection provided several insights. First, the theater commander looks within his command to determine if the necessary capabilities can be supplied. Organizationally, the unified commands derive functional needs from operational tasks, determining availability of their assigned forces and considering the use of nonmilitary capabilities. In making these decisions, the CINC must consider the functional requirements for the mission (the demand) compared with the functional capabilities within the theater (the supply) and whether there are competing requirements for these forces.

In specific cases where it is recognized that needed functional capabilities reside only in the RC or are otherwise unavailable in the active forces, the unified command may attempt to establish the potential to obtain RC capabilities involuntarily through PSRC. Normally, the unified or joint-level commands are interested in only some of the criteria. They consider RC forces and capabilities in their planning only when it is clear that other sources will not suffice. The next step is to determine potential constraints on the operational plan. In essence, this level of command does not decide or prescribe the source component when requesting forces and capabilities. For most peacetime contingency missions, the supported commander will have to look beyond theater forces to obtain the needed military capabilities.

An alternative to meeting U.S. operational requirements with assigned forces is to consider nonmilitary providers. Civilian logistics and Service contractors, such as Brown and Root, have been used by the military in many peacetime contingency missions. For example, Brown and Root provided support functions, such as laundry and dining facilities, for Operation Restore Hope.³ Civilian contractors come at a cost, however. Theater commanders typically do not have funds available for civilian support on a contingency basis and must also consider the level of risk should hostilities arise. Therefore, when it appears that civilian contractors are a viable option within acceptable risks for satisfying specific mission requirements, the theater commander needs to request approval

²Information provided by staff planners at USACOM, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and FORSCOM, October 1994–March 1995.

³USARCENT briefing on “LOGCAP: Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program,” March 1995.

and funding through the CJCS to the military departments, which may already have access to these nonmilitary resources. There appears to be an increasing proclivity to select civilian sources for capabilities that are resident in the RC.⁴

At the Service component commands of the supported unified command, the Service policies and cultures are reflected in how the decisions on force selection are made. The criteria on functional requirements and availability are applied against assigned forces. At this point, different Service component commands tend to make decisions that follow their cultures. For example, if active forces are not available, from either assigned forces or informal coordination with other active Service commands composed of such forces, Army planners may well consider the use of nonmilitary capabilities, where these match needed functional requirements, before considering reserves. In the Air Force, availability of RC forces, particularly lift, tanker, and support elements, would normally be determined as part of the initial coordination process rather than as a separate step, because they are in routine use. However, the normal case is to use active forces except when they are not available in sufficient quantity or functional type. This process presents a bias, supported by most Service policies, that fails to consider RC forces as feasible options.

In almost all contingency operations, the theater commander must turn to other force and capability providers, such as USACOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM, to provide at least some of the military capabilities needed to perform the mission-related tasks. At these supporting combatant commands, the forces are also assigned to service supporting commands that apply similar Service perspectives to the selection of needed forces (as noted earlier).

Insights on Impediments to Use in the Force Selection Process

Reviewing the five categories of force selection criteria, we find that either institutional or resource factors bias most decisions toward using AC forces. Table 4.1 summarizes the findings, and we expand on them below.

Our interviews with planning staffs provided many useful insights to the potential for impediments to the selection of RC forces. While these do not apply universally to all the reserve components, it is apparent that the related

⁴ Multiple interviews with staff officers of the regional unified commands and component commands, January through August, 1995.

Table 4.1
Effect of Factors on Selection Criteria

Selection Criteria	Institutional Bias	Resource Bias
Availability	AC	AC
Functional requirements	Neutral, unless unique capability involved	N/A
Responsiveness	AC	AC
Level of risk	AC	AC
Perceived national importance/public acceptance	AC	N/A
Accessibility	AC	AC

NOTE: N/A = not applicable..

institutional and resource factors are the underlying basis for most potential impediments.

Availability institutionally favors the use of active forces. Defense policies for sizing the active forces intend that they be used first and be reinforced for large or continuing peacetime operations. Functional requirements are generally neutral, except as the Service cultures have distributed capabilities between components. Civil affairs capabilities in the Army and substantial portions of airlift in the Air Force are examples where institutional distribution of capabilities tends to favor the RC. The effects seem neutral where capabilities are equal.

Responsiveness of needed forces, particularly in contingency operations, and level of risk are generally biased institutionally and by resourcing to favor active forces.⁵ This bias may be totally appropriate, but active forces are usually more responsive because of higher levels of peacetime readiness.

As mentioned earlier, mission importance and public support are implicit criteria that are applied only to the RC, and, more specifically, to volunteer support from the RC. Active forces and the RC will follow orders for deployment and call-up. However, where the importance of the mission to U.S. national objectives is not clear and the public does not support involvement in a peacetime contingency, it will be much more difficult to obtain needed reserve volunteers.

⁵The Air Force maintains their reserve elements at the same standard of readiness as the active force, but ARC responsiveness usually assumes a 48-hour recall and preparation period not assumed for active units.

Similarly, accessibility applies only to the RC and thus tends to favor active forces. Decisions to use authorities to obtain the reserves involuntarily, such as by PSRC, makes this criteria moot because all forces become available. Without involuntary call-up, obtaining volunteers and ensuring the necessary sources and types of funding may be problematic for several of the Services from both an institutional and resource perspective.⁶

Insights from Foreign Military Experience on Using Reserves

We examined the history of use of reserves in several Western foreign militaries with experience in peacetime contingency operations to see if there were useful insights to inform our study.⁷ We recognize that the Western nations that employ their reserves in overseas contingencies have military and reserve structures that differ greatly from those of the United States. In general, the trained reserve forces of these foreign nations are much smaller than their active military forces, and by comparison, the U.S. active and reserve forces are larger by an order of magnitude than those in the countries we reviewed. With that insight, our key findings follow.

We observed several similarities in the international peacetime operations to the criteria used for U.S. force selection decisions. However, the institutional policies of other nations relied more on active forces in peacetime operations and generally excluded the use of reserves. Accessibility was generally limited to volunteers in peacetime, and funding was restricted except when providing forces to the United Nations, which provided some reimbursement.

Foreign militaries use their reserve forces quite differently. First, most NATO militaries seldom employ reserve forces in any operation short of a major wartime mobilization. Second, in those cases where these countries used reserves in peacetime missions, the reserves were individual volunteers who augmented the strengths of active military units or were joined with active military volunteers to form new units created for a specific mission and period of employment. Third, the several NATO militaries that were involved in peacetime missions seldom performed these operations on a contingency basis.

⁶ Medical capabilities are an exception. Often Reserve medical personnel are obtained voluntarily since concern for medical personnel retention has tempered the use of PSRC for these skills in OOTW.

⁷ We researched the literature, interviewed military staff and attachés from the NATO countries, and reviewed the numerous UN OOTW-type missions that involved military forces. We also visited the Canadian defense and military organizations to obtain detailed knowledge of their lengthy military experience in peace and humanitarian operations.

Most operations began only after several months of deliberate planning and force preparation. In those cases where contingency operations were performed, usually only active military forces were employed. Last, the missions were largely peacekeeping operations with scheduled employments for periods of six months under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate.

The use of reserve volunteer personnel was usually for fixed periods of active duty from 10 to 12 months. This period is generally divided into three segments: (1) training, organization, preparation, and deployment lasting about three to four months; (2) operational employment for about six months; and (3) redeployment, recovery, and deactivation lasting about one to two months. When the peacetime operations were long term, such as the peacekeeping mission on Cyprus, the rotation of units and the recurrence of the cycle became standard and routine for both planning and execution, which greatly facilitated using individual reserve volunteers.⁸

From the perspective of the United Nations, operations involving military forces encompass both peace and humanitarian operations. In peace operations, military forces are the essential element around which the mandate for operations is developed. Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are usually performed by lightly armed ground forces and necessary support elements. In humanitarian operations, military capabilities are usually temporary substitutes for more desirable civilian capabilities that may be slow in reacting to a crisis. In general, the mandates for UN humanitarian operations that require the initial employment of military forces or capabilities often specify the level of armament for the military elements and relate it directly to the anticipated risk of hostilities.

The review of UN and foreign military involvements in peacetime contingency operations appears to have only limited application to U.S. reserves since few other countries have comparable reserve systems, seldom use reserves in peacetime operations, and rely almost exclusively on volunteer army reservists when they are employed. However, their experiences in duration of employments and processes for preparing volunteer units for peacetime operations may provide useful models for consideration by the U.S. military.

⁸ Many of the countries we researched have most of their military medical assets residing in their reserves. Those countries with a long history of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance tend to rely heavily on those reserve medical assets to support OOTW. Recent experience in peacetime contingencies suggest that frequent use of reserve medical personnel results in recruitment and retention problems. For example, Canada is experiencing medical staff recruitment problems for some OOTW missions and has difficulty in retention because of the high OPTEMPO of medical units. Canadian physicians have become increasingly concerned about the impact of OOTW deployments on their practices, with some patients having switched physicians to those who do not deploy or who do so only on an infrequent basis.

5. The Implications of Service Cultures for the Selection and Use of Reserves in Peacetime Contingencies

In the preceding sections, we have discussed how the requirements for resources are generated by operational commanders and, if need be, translated into requests for support from force providers. We have also discussed the decision process followed by force providers in considering alternative sources for the capabilities requested. We now turn to how the Services, which have the primary responsibility for manning, training, and equipping units, approach the structuring and resourcing of their reserve forces to produce the complex variety of capabilities needed in both wartime and peacetime operations. This process is the third portion of our analytic framework and relates to the items underlined in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1—Service Reserve Cultures: Integrating Supply with Demand

Service cultures shape the decisions on how the reserve forces are matched to the operational demand. We discuss how Service cultures affect the selection and use of the reserves. We conclude with some observations on how these cultures affect both the selection and employment of RC forces for peacetime overseas contingencies.

Service Cultures

Even a casual look across the military Services reveals significant differences in how the active and reserve components integrate and interact both during peacetime training and during mobilizations and deployments for operations of all kinds. Although there is broad guidance from Congress and the Department of Defense on Total Force Policy¹ that states that reserve units will be fully integrated with active units in case of war, each Service implements this broad policy in a manner that the leadership deems best suited to the wartime tasks and weapons systems available. This practice creates significant variations across the Services in how reserve units are resourced and employed. We describe some of the most important and obvious differences in Service cultures, and then discuss whether there are any analytical reasons to conclude that these impede the use of reserve forces in peacetime operations.

We refer to these differences collectively as Service cultures—institutional relations that often have historical roots and that determine many of the particular assignments given to individuals and units within the Services. In general, no mission or assignment given to a reserve unit or individual could not be performed by an active counterpart (although not always to the same standards in certain special cases such as civil affairs units); hence, considerations other than necessity explain the roles assigned to reserve units and individuals. Whereas the availability of resources or the desire for a rapid response may be why a particular capability is placed in the active or in the reserve component, sometimes more complex reasons for the decision may lie deep in history or in practices that have become customary over time.

By using the word culture to describe Service practices, we do not suggest that the reasons for a particular set of cultural relations inside a Service can be

¹Total Force Policy is a label for a large set of complex issues. For a thorough discussion in the context of determining the best force structure and force mix for a two-MRC case, see National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, RAND, MR-140-1-OSD, 1992, especially Chapter 1. See also two background studies written for the just mentioned study by M. Brauner, H. Thie, and R. Brown, *Effectiveness of Total Force Policy in the Persian Gulf Conflict*, RAND, MR-132-OSD, 1992, and L. Lewis, C. R. Roll, and J. D. Mayer, *Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy*, RAND, MR-133-OSD, 1992.

understood only by historical and anthropological research or that cultures are somehow the arbitrary current end point of an evolutionary chain of events that could equally well have taken different routes to other end points. In fact, in our judgment, it is most likely that differences in Service cultures have developed over time largely in response to differences in the stringent technical and professional demands of the varying battlefield conditions faced by each Service. Service roles and missions as well as methods for deploying specific military capabilities create different demands for the organization and integration of units among the Services.

The word culture implies that to understand elements of the relationship between active and reserve forces one must know the history behind existing traditions and attitudes. An obvious example is that the Army and the Air Force have both a National Guard and a reserve component, whereas the Navy and the Marine Corps only have the latter. The historically determined federal-state partnership in the National Guard has no doubt greatly influenced the determination of wartime and peacetime organizations and mission assignments in the Army and the Air Force. For this study, it is sufficient to note that these exist and to state that it would take us too far afield to investigate the complex reasons for their existence. While we recognize that historical factors lie behind Service cultures, we do not attempt to explain or evaluate them.

We will therefore simply describe here some of the most important differences in Service cultures without assessing whether these differences depend on other factors—such as technical military conditions, historico-political evolutions, budgetary judgments, etc. We make no normative judgments about the Service cultures or suggest that they can or should be changed.

Mobilization and Deployment Policies

It is easy to overgeneralize and simplify any depiction of how the military Services organize themselves and how they prepare for and conduct wartime assignments. The Army takes and holds ground, the Air Force secures the airspace and conducts deep strike missions, the Navy dominates the approaches from the sea to land and conducts sea-based strikes against land-based targets, and the Marines deliver a rapid reaction force with special capability for littoral warfare.

In fact, all the Services equip and train a multitude of different units and produce a complexity and diversity of capabilities. The Services strive for flexibility in how they combine capabilities into forces that can be employed with maximum

efficiency by an operational commander. Even with these complexities of capabilities and organizations, certain general patterns stand out.

The most basic yet simplistic observation that separates the Services from each other is perhaps that the Army and the Marine Corps man, equip, and train *operational units*, whereas the Navy and the Air Force man and train on *weapons systems*. This difference leads the Army and the Marine Corps to plan primarily for mobilizing units and integrating them into larger force structures, such as the brigades and divisions that constitute the basic fighting elements of the ground forces. Hence, the Army and the Marine Corps emphasize *unit integrity*, in peacetime as well as during operational deployments.

On the other hand, the Navy and the Air Force have great flexibility in combining weapons systems into larger or smaller force structures specially tailored to an operational commander's particular requirements, and therefore concentrate on *weapons systems availability*. Examples are the sortie generation capability of a ship or an air wing or the ability of a platform to perform up to its design capabilities. The Navy and the Air Force plan for *systems that are adequately manned*. As long as people are trained properly on the equipment, unit integrity is not as critical to the Navy and the Air Force as it is to the Army and the Marine Corps because the weapons systems platform will be capable of contributing as designed if it is manned by individuals who all know their individual tasks, even if they have not worked together for very long.

Clearly, while this characterization captures some overarching differences among the Services, there are many exceptions. The Army and the Marine Corps have aviation units that function in all important aspects just like Navy and Air Force units in that the emphasis is on manning equipment rather than units. Similarly, the Air Force and the Navy have fighting units that function very much like ground forces in that unit integrity is a primary factor in determining mission effectiveness, such as, for example, Red Horse units in the Air Force that provide wartime base heavy engineering functions and Navy SEAL units that provide a highly skilled special operations capability.

The fundamental difference between stressing unit capability versus systems availability would seem to be of signal importance in determining the primary reserve mobilization concept employed by each Service.² Table 5.1 summarizes three important differences between the Services that immediately follow from this basic distinction.

²These observations are based on an examination of Service mobilization planning documents and on conversations with mobilization planners.

Table 5.1
Mobilization Policy Issues

Service	Primary Mobilization Concept	Policy on Operational Use of Selected Reserve	Preference for Use/Authority
ARNG/USAR	Augment, reinforce, backfill AC units	As intact units	In support of AC, PSRC/mobilization
USNR	Augment AC units	Individuals, some units	Augmentation of AC units, volunteers
USMCR	Augment and reinforce AC units	As intact units	In support of AC, PSRC/mobilization
ANG/AFRES	Augment and reinforce AC units	As units (possibly composite)	Routine augmentation of AC, volunteers

The table lists the primary mobilization concept for each of the four Services. The Army and the Marine Corps mobilize reserve units to augment and reinforce active component units or forces; these units deliver operational capabilities as integral units that are seldom broken up. In contradistinction to this, the Navy and the Air Force rely to a much higher degree on individual augmentation. This is particularly the case for the Navy, where individuals are assigned to reserve units in peacetime but are typically assigned to a billet in an active unit during mobilizations; in practice, this means that Navy unequipped Selected Reserve units function as administrative units during peacetime and that the units themselves do not have any function during mobilizations because reservists become attached to active duty units. While the Air Force organizes reserve units to deliver operational capabilities, it has great flexibility in whether and how to deploy them. Reserve units may be mobilized and operate as units, or various parts of several reserve units may be pieced together to form an entirely new unit. It is not unusual for both aircrews and support personnel to share tasks and assignments relatively seamlessly between active and reserve component personnel. In addition, the Air Force has a concept called Associate Units. These are reminiscent of certain Navy arrangements, in that the active component owns and maintains the equipment—the aircraft—but reserve component aircrews operate them by taking turns with active force aircrews in flying similar missions on the same equipment.

The desire to mobilize units in the Army and the Marine Corps, in contrast to the greater ability and willingness to rely on volunteer individuals in the Navy and the Air Force, lead to differences in methods and authorities used to bring reserve capabilities into the active component. As noted in the second column of Table 5.1, the Army and the Marine Corps use reserve units in support of active units, whether they are combat, Combat Support, or Combat Service Support

units. Also, since it is often difficult to ensure that individual RC units volunteer with all their assigned personnel and to guarantee the availability of volunteer RC units even when they are available for extended periods, the third column indicates that the Army and the Marine Corps explicitly plan on receiving Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority, which authorizes the involuntary mobilization of members of the Selected Reserve.³

The Navy does not need to rely on this authority during either short or long conflicts. To meet short-term needs for individuals to fill empty billets on shore or on ships, such as typically can be expected to occur during peacetime operations, the Navy can safely rely on volunteers, and during longer conflicts, general mobilization will ensure that the Navy can access and retain reservists for as long as required.

Whereas the Air Force prefers to employ RC individuals rather than mobilize units, it is easier for them to rely on volunteers than it is for the Army and the Marine Corps because the Air Force does so routinely and can combine people and equipment from various units into an existing one. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Air Force to create so-called Rainbow units that are composed of planes from various reserve wings or squadrons, and to rotate personnel in and out so that only full-time reserves remain with the unit throughout an entire operation. Such a free rotation of RC individuals would not be an acceptable practice in the Army or Marine Corps.⁴

Responsiveness and Readiness Policies

Other cultural differences arise from varying battlefield conditions and weapons systems constraints. Deployment plans, lift requirements, and the complexity of

³Section 12304 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

⁴Reservists who wish to create opportunities for greater participation in various kinds of operations have suggested that, particularly for the Army, more frequent rotation of individual volunteers within deployed reserve component units would improve accessibility. It might be inferred that people who advocate such policies consider the Army practice of preferring to mobilize units rather than individuals as determined by history and custom rather than by the operational demands of the mission. This shows how difficult it is to make a clear-cut distinction between operational demands and those created by history and habit, because there are no objective or analytical grounds to determine whether the stress on unit integrity is operationally or historically justified. While a plausible case can be made for the importance of unit integrity in ground units, the argument is weakened in practice in at least two respects. One, unit integrity is low in active component units because of a rotation policy that creates considerable turbulence in peacetime. Second, few active Army units are up to their wartime required strength in peacetime and will therefore acquire additional personnel through so-called cross-leveling from other units before deployment to an operation, which means adding personnel just before an operational assignment begins. If unit integrity were a truly overriding criterion, these policies would be unacceptable. The conclusion must be that while unit integrity is desirable and valuable, there are limits to how much integrity can be realistically achieved. Further study is needed to decide whether it is possible to rely on reserve units with frequent personnel rotations during peacetime operations.

platforms combine to create differences in readiness resourcing and mobilization concepts between the Services. The reserve components in the four Services provide both combat and support capabilities in combinations suited to each Services' policies and plans. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force represent three very different models of responsiveness and readiness, with the Marine Corps—for natural reasons and by design—combining elements of all three models (see Table 5.2).

The Army has to be capable of fighting under a variety of conditions requiring anything from a small special operations capability or a company that can offer Service support capability in a minor peacetime operation up to a full-scale war requiring general mobilization for an indefinite period. Since its basic task is to take and hold ground, the Army often has to mobilize large units with a great variety of heavy equipment in large numbers, a process that can take considerable time. It would be so costly to provide air and sea lift capabilities to ship the entire Army anywhere in the world at short notice that it would simply not make sense to make that investment; hence, time must be available before many Army units can deploy. This period can be extended by additional train-up time in a theater of operations before actual operations commence, as early arriving units await those shipped later. For this reason, the Army has a complex system of tiering the readiness status of units in both the active and reserve components. Some active units are available for operational deployments immediately and have all the required personnel and equipment assigned to them in peacetime, with both at a high readiness status. However, most active and all reserve units require at least some additional personnel, equipment, and training before deployment. Some RC units may have required equipment and personnel assigned, but will need individual and unit training after mobilization to be prepared for their operational assignments. Still other RC peacetime units

Table 5.2
Training and Readiness Issues

Service	Availability Once Activated	Peacetime Resource Levels for Readiness	Responsiveness Considerations
ARNG/USAR	Significant training after mobilization	Tiered readiness with many units C-3 ^a	Unit equipment and personnel shortages
USNR	Deploy on short notice	Units at C-2 or better	Units fully equipped but not fully manned
USMCR	Short training after mobilization	All units at C-2 or better	Unit equipment in depots fully manned
ANG/AFRES	Deploy on short notice	All units at C-1, same as AC	Units fully equipped and manned

^aC- is readiness level.

may have only some fraction of their wartime requirements of personnel and equipment, and such units will require considerable time after mobilization to become ready. Many Army reserve units are therefore resourced only at a C-3 readiness status in peacetime, and may even have to deploy at that level during large mobilizations—that is, the shortages will not be made up.⁵

The Air Force represents the other extreme. The emphasis in the Air Force is on ensuring that all systems and platforms are ready to support immediate deployment, no matter where the capabilities reside. Unlike the Army, the Air Force can quickly move its operations anywhere in the world if there is sufficient infrastructure to allow air operations; it does not need to adapt to the slower deployment schedule imposed by land and sea transport. Thus, Air Force policy provides sufficient resources to all units so that they can deploy in a matter of days, at most. No time is provided in mobilization planning for post-mobilization train-up time; all units and personnel are expected to be prepared to deploy almost immediately. All units are fully equipped and resourced at near C-1 readiness levels in peacetime.

The Navy has developed a system of cycling units and platforms through a step-wise series of preparations for deployment. Ships at sea for extended deployments experience considerable wear and tear on equipment and structures, and thus require extensive shipyard maintenance to repair. Upgrades to various onboard systems are scheduled throughout the lifetime of a ship. Therefore, ships usually stand down and go into maintenance after deployment, and the ship's complement is either quartered within the maintenance port to assist refitting or dispersed to various shore-based assignments. After repairs, the crew reports back aboard ship and a schedule of work-ups toward deployment begins that include individual and unit training. This process culminates in the ship being certified for deployment, whereupon it assumes its peacetime (or wartime) operational assignment.

Reserve ships are not expected to deploy on the same schedule as do active ships, and may therefore be resourced at their peak only at C-2. On the other hand, much like the Air Force, the demands of the platform are such that a large majority, usually over 70 percent, of the crew on a reserve fleet ship are either active component personnel assigned to a reserve unit or reservists on full-time status. A ship cannot sail and a plane cannot fly safely without a higher level of readiness of key personnel than would be required in many Army units that are

⁵C-3 readiness status means (among other things) that personnel strength can be as low as 70 percent of the wartime requirement, that equipment on hand can be as low as 65 percent, that the mission capable rate equals or exceeds 60 percent (50 percent for aircraft), and that train-up time is between four and seven weeks. Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting System*.

designed for slow deployment in a support role. This leads the Navy to save on peacetime resources in reserve units by reducing full-time active manning levels to a minimum necessary for safe peacetime operations, and hence plan for individual RC augmentation during mobilization and deployment to operational contingencies.

The Marine Corps, like the Army, can deploy various flexible force packages tailored to specific operational requirements, but differs from the Army in that all Marine ground units specialize in rapid deployment of units with relatively lighter equipment than heavy Army units. This means that the Marine Corps cannot plan for any lengthy post-mobilization train-up and equipping time. Reserve units may not have on hand all the equipment they will require during deployment, but neither do all active units. Therefore, after mobilization units in both components may have to draw some equipment stored in depots. By deliberately pursuing a policy of integrating reserve units only at battalion level and below, the Marine Corps avoids the lengthy train-up time of reserve units required in the Army (estimated to be 95 days for a heavy combat maneuver brigade).⁶ Furthermore, the Marine Corps explicitly strives to integrate reserve component units into all parts of its force structure by attaching reserve combat and support elements to active units at battalion and below.⁷ Since the Marines align closely with the Navy, they do not tier their units in the same way as the Army, but cycle units through deployment, recovery, and train-up to match up with the Navy's deployment schedules. Lastly, like the Air Force, the Marine Corps strives to provide as much of its capability as possible at a high readiness level and resources all reserve units at least at C-2 readiness status.

Resourcing and Support Policies

Battlefield roles and weapons systems, as argued above, to a large extent are responsible for differences among the Services' reliance on reserves in mobilizations, deployments, and operational assignments. However, as illustrated in Table 5.3 below, there are also important differences among the

⁶The estimate of 95 days seems to be a widely quoted average based on Army experience during Operation Desert Storm (ODS). RAND research on these issues reports a range from 79 to 128 train-up days for heavy combat maneuver brigades, depending on assumptions regarding the status of the unit at the time of mobilization. The methodology is described in T. F. Lippiatt, J. M. Polich, and R. E. Sortor, *Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, MR-124-A, RAND, 1992. The data quoted come from Table 6, p. 32, of this report.

⁷The Army did not deploy any reserve combat maneuver units during ODS because no brigade was certified as ready until the fight was over, but the Marine Corps sent reserve combat maneuver units—battalions and companies—into combat as integral elements of active forces. As noted, the reasons are to be found in the Marine Corps' policy of integrating smaller units into forces than does the Army, and in differences in equipment and battlefield assignments.

Table 5.3
Relative Sizes of Reserve Component Forces

Service	Assigned End Strength (000)	Selected Reserve as Percent of Total Force	Share of Total Service Budget Authorization (percent)
ARNG/USAR	397/250	33/22 total ~55	12/7 total ~19
USNR	108	~22	~5
USMCR	41	~19	~5
ANG/AFRES	114/80	18/13 total ~31	9/5 total ~14

SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *FY 94 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs*, January 1995, pp. 7, 37.

Services in total end strength assigned to the reserve and in the percentage of total force residing in the reserve component. It is not clear that these differences are as easily related to operational and technical considerations as other factors might be.

The Army has more than half of its total end strength assigned to its two reserve components, by far the highest percentage of any of the Services. By a 1993 internal decision in the Army,⁸ the Army National Guard is designed to have a high content of combat and combat support elements. The units are structured into eight divisions, including doctrinal support elements, with an additional 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades. There can be no doubt that this force structure to a large extent is determined by historical considerations; the tradition that the Guard should be structured into divisions that are intended to assume suitable battlefield operational assignments during large contingencies has its roots in past wars, in particular World War II. This was also considered a suitable arrangement in planning for a major conflict with the Soviet Union during the cold war. It has carried over into the current era of planning for two MRCs; however, until recently no combat units in the Army Guard were included in any war plans. The most recent planning factors envision deploying some of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to the second MRC,⁹ which would require mobilizing the brigades early during the first contingency to allow for sufficient train-up time so that they can be deployed either to backfill active units assigned to the second MRC or to close the first MRC after it has been essentially won.

⁸Commonly referred to within the Army as the "Off-Site Agreement."

⁹Derived from the scenarios that accompany the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

The rest of the Army Guard units represent a capability to ensure that basic strategic deterrence is not lost even during two MRCs and that provides a reconstitution base in case the two MRCs should turn out badly.

The Army reserve does not at present have any major combat units, but is structured exclusively around Combat Support and Combat Service Support. This reflects an Army judgment made during the drawdown after the cold war that the active component should retain as much combat structure as possible, and that the Army reserve should provide a considerable portion of the support elements.¹⁰ This policy has the practical implication that today's active Army cannot assume any significant operational assignment without relying on support elements from its reserve forces.¹¹

The Navy reserve represents about 22 percent of total end strength. As already noted, it is mostly structured to provide primarily individual augmentation, but has certain equipped units as well. In 1995, there were several ships including 16 frigates (FFGs) and one aircraft carrier assigned to the reserves, and half of the 30 Construction Battalions (Seabees) were in the reserve component. There are also some Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units (MIUWUs) and several flying squadrons in the reserves. For the most part, however, the Navy relies extensively on individual augmentees to fill empty billets on active ships and will deploy its reserve ships only in larger contingencies.

The Marines have a full division, an air wing, and a Service support group in the reserve component, structured just like its active formations, with the result that just under 20 percent of the Marine Corps resides in the reserve. While the reserve division could in principle be called up as a unit in a major contingency, its leadership would then most likely be active (unlike the Army Guard where the leadership is expected to remain in the reserve component). In practice, it is Marine Corps policy to call up small unit elements—battalions and companies—from the reserve to support active component units when the need arises, and this is likely to continue to be the policy for anything but the most demanding scenarios that would require full mobilization of the entire Marine Corps.

The Air Force has 7 of its 20 fighter wing equivalents in the Air Reserve Component (ARC) and around 18 percent of its total force in the Guard and 13 percent in the reserve. Hence, almost one third of the total end strength in the

¹⁰For example, the Army reserve contains the vast majority of the medical capabilities in the total Army structure.

¹¹To support the deployment to Bosnia, the Army asked for and was granted PSRC to call up 3800 reservists. The overwhelming majority of these, around 3300, were used to backfill for active units in Germany that deployed to Bosnia, and the remaining RC soldiers were sent to either Hungary or Bosnia.

Air Force is assigned to the reserve components. Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve include both combat and transport wings. Because the demands on the Air Force for lift capability are high even during peacetime, reserve units fly many missions for USTRANSCOM in support of all the services. The Air Force relies on reserve component combat units to support peacetime operations, both in direct support and in a backfill role to relieve high OPTEMPO in active units deployed to peacetime operations.

Clearly, the significant differences between the Services in the structure of reserve component capabilities represent very different concepts of the role of reserve units and how to integrate reserve and active component capabilities in operational assignments. The two extremes would seem to be represented by the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard: the Army has structured its Guard so that its combat units will deploy only in the most demanding warfighting scenarios, and has no plans to use them in any OOTW, minor regional contingency, or in a war of only one major regional contingency; the Air Force, in contrast, integrates Guard units into current operations of any kind along with Air Force reserve and active component units as a matter of course. These differences are striking indeed and can probably only be understood as elements of deeply ingrained cultural factors in both Guard and active elements of the two Services.

It is of some interest to compare the last two columns in Table 5.3, which illustrate factors that are closely related to the preceding observations. In the Navy and the Marine Corps, roughly one-fifth of the force resides in the reserve component, but only one-twentieth of the Services' budgets are set aside for these units. This apportionment of resources for the RC is primarily related to personnel compensation and pay versus the full range of Service resource considerations, which also include large allocations of operations, maintenance, and investment resources. In the Navy, some reserve ships and aircraft and some construction battalions have equipment that requires operations and maintenance (O&M) funding, but the overwhelming majority of the equipment resides in the active force. Most equipment for Marine Corps reserve units is purchased with active funds, so the small share of the Marine Corps budget assigned to the reserve component primarily represents reserve compensation and O&M funding. In the case of the Army and the Air Force, the share of the total budget is larger because of the larger portion in the RCs; the share also includes personnel and O&M funding for reserve units and individuals. However, the composition of the Air Force budget for the ARC is different—much more is provided for OPTEMPO and reflects both increased ARC readiness and involvement in peacetime operations.

Table 5.4 illustrates additional facts that describe important differences in Service cultures. The first column shows the percentage of full-time support each Service funds for its reserve components; this column indicates that the Air Force is clearly ahead of the other Services in this regard, and supports the fact already noted that aircrews in the ANG and AFRES routinely fly a significant portion of the total Air Force peacetime airlift and refueling missions. The relatively high number for the Navy reflects the requirement for full-time manning of reserve ships, referred to above. The Marine Corps provides resources for active full-time support for its reserve component. The Army generally provides less full-time support to its RC than the other Services.

Similar considerations are apparent in the column on AC assigned to full-time support. This column indicates that the Marine Corps, as a share of its active end strength, provides the greatest quantity of resources to its reserve component. The low numbers on the lines for the Air Force and the Navy are related to two factors, one of which was mentioned above—that these two Services provide substantial resources for full-time support in reserve units; the other factor is related to the higher prior-service content in these reserve components. The Air Force and Navy reserve components have high levels of experience from active duty personnel who have transferred into their respective RC. The Army provides less active support to its reserve components than the Air Force or Navy, but this reflects only those active personnel assigned to reserve units. Overall, the Army is second only to the Marines in providing active full-time

Table 5.4
Certain Additional Facts Relating to Service Cultures

Service	Full-time Support as Percent of End Strength	AC Assigned to Full-Time Support
ARNG/USAR	13/9	174/851 ^a Total < 0.2
USNR	20	1477 ~.3
USMCR	16	4234 ~2.4
ANG/AFRES	31/22	1012/651 Total ~0.3

SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 41.

^aWhile the Reserve Forces Policy Board for FY 1995 reports only full-time support personnel that are assigned to RC units, the Army has about 5000 additional personnel assigned to positions that support RC activities, which brings their current total to about 6000 active personnel or about 1.2 percent of the total active Army involved in supporting the RC.

support. Much of this results from recent legislative mandates to increase the active support the Army provides for the ARNG and USAR.¹²

Of particular interest for the conduct of peacetime operations is how much funding each of the Services provides for support of the active component by the reserve component. Since reserve component personnel on active duty status have to be paid from active component personnel funds, a Service that intends to rely on reservists to provide support for active peacetime operations must budget for it in its account for compensating active duty personnel. The Services use different designations for this special funding authority—the Army calls it Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD). Whatever the particular designation, the applicable law is the same, i.e., that reservists must be paid from the active personnel account when on active duty status.

Table 5.5 summarizes Service funds provided for RC support to AC peacetime operations. As can be seen, the Air Force programs and budgets a significant amount of resources to pay reservists while supporting active operations. The Navy, with a reserve end strength of about half that of the Air Force, budgets at a level that computes to a little more than half that of the Air Force when put on the same basis. The Army and the Marine Corps provide negligible funds for paying individual reservists while on active duty status, reflecting their clear preference for relying on units called up under PSRC or mobilization authority, which usually means that Congress authorizes funds for paying reservists subject to involuntary call-up.

There is an additional source of personnel compensation funds that, in some cases, can qualify for use in paying reservists on active duty support. These funds are called Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), and are authorized in congressional statutes to be spent out of the reserve personnel account subject to specific limitations. To ensure the integrity of the intent of the funds, the Services

Table 5.5
Service Funding for RC Support of Active Operations

	ARNG/USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG/AFRES
AC funds for RC support of AC operations	< \$15M per year	> \$30M per year	< \$5M per year	> \$100M per year

SOURCE: Service budgets for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

¹²Data provided from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, November 1995.

are expressly prohibited from using these funds to pay for reservists on active duty support. The funds are meant to assist reservists—not active duty personnel—in improving their training and skill levels while on active duty.

The Services observe these rules in somewhat different spirit. The Army adheres to the letter of the law, and provides small amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used strictly for supporting training activities for RC personnel; this again reflects the Army's preference for employing units rather than individuals in active support roles. The Navy, with a different philosophy, programs substantial amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used for bringing individuals on board active ships, often in direct active support roles during operational assignments. The Navy, credibly, argues that there is no better individual training available to reservists than to operate equipment and perform functions under the supervision of active duty personnel engaged in actual operational assignments. Because it frequently uses fully trained RC assets to perform short-notice, traditionally active missions, the Air Force will often have an RC unit perform such a mission and then identify portions of the mission cost for appropriate payment from either the active or reserve personnel accounts, depending upon what was accomplished, active Air Force support or training of reservists. Applying the same logic as the Navy, the Air Force embraces the principle that many missions in support of active duty operations really provide the highest quality training possible for reservists and that there is no breach of faith or law in paying for such activities from ADSW funds.

One other cultural difference deserves mention. The Army, alone among the four Services, for the last few years has provided special training in peacekeeping operations to active combat units that may be deployed to such duty.¹³ The Army view is that peacekeeping may be more demanding than even combat. The training is provided in two locations, the Combined Arms Training Center at Hohenfels in Germany and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk in Louisiana, and aims to train individuals and units in how to deal with and defuse potentially explosive situations. Each unit that comes to these training programs is assumed to have all combat-related individual and small unit skills already trained to proficiency, and then adds to this level of ability the special skills needed to conduct peacekeeping operations in an environment that may look cooperative but which may turn hostile at a moment's notice. Particular attention is given to mine clearing operations and awareness of other explosives, to the potential for being accused of favoritism by either of the opposing sides, to

¹³Interviews with Army training staff officers at the Combined Arms Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, in June 1995.

how to avoid and if need be address direct provocations by locals, to detect smuggling operations, to negotiate and defuse tense situations rather than pull the trigger, etc. The Army has sent both active and RC units to support NATO operations in Bosnia, and it provided these units with the necessary pre-employment training and preparation at the Hohenfels training facility. This specialized training is additive to normal post-mobilization training provided to Army RC units.

Summary Assessment

The main cultural differences between the Services can be summarized as follows.

- The Army has the largest proportion of its total force structure in its reserve components, and bases all mobilization planning on unit augmentation. Because of the resources required, the Army relies on a system of post-mobilization train-up time that saves considerable resources by not having all units fully resourced or trained in peacetime. The Army relies heavily on its reserve for support of active combat units, and has structured its Guard to contain largely combat units, the overwhelming majority of which will be used only in wars not currently included in any contingency plans. The Army provides low levels of full-time support for its reserve elements and few resources for reserve support of active operations.
- The Navy has a relatively small reserve component, and bases its mobilization concept primarily on individual augmentation of active units. It provides its reserve units with sufficient resources to attain a high readiness standard in peacetime. The Navy has significant resources for bringing reserve individuals on active duty in support roles.
- The Air Force active and reserve forces are so highly integrated in both peacetime and wartime that the distinction often is virtually meaningless. The Air Force provides substantial resources for full-time support of reserve units, ensures that they are all at a high level of readiness, budgets significant amounts for reserve support of active operations, and is capable of integrating reserve units and individuals into all active operations apparently quite seamlessly.
- The Marine Corps has structured its reserve component to mirror the active, and plans to mobilize its reserve only in a major contingency. Because the Marines aim to be ready for rapid deployment, both active and reserve units are resourced to high readiness standards in peacetime. The mobilization doctrine is based on unit augmentation, but units do not require long train-up times. While

there is a large commitment of active duty personnel to full-time support of reserve units, the Marines do not budget significant resources for reserve support of active operations.

Given these considerable differences in how the Services structure and resource their RC and the differences in mobilization and integration principles that underlie structuring and resourcing decisions, one essential conclusion can be drawn about the role of reserve elements in peacetime operations: the considerations that enter into Service decisions to select and employ RC units are strongly based in the broad features of the Service cultures discussed above. Hence, there are significant differences in how easily reserve units and personnel integrate with active forces during mobilizations for all military operations. They can be summarized as follows:

It is probably safe to state that individual augmentees in all the Services can quickly and easily integrate into active units, provided they have completed all their required individual skill training and have participated in the requisite unit training activities. Hence, the Navy and the Air Force find it more convenient to use individual augmentees than the Army and the Marine Corps, where the primary mobilization concept is to activate units. The Army and the Marine Corps are quite capable of accommodating a certain quantity of individual augmentees and of integrating them successfully into active units, but not to the point where a commander would consider unit integrity to be at risk.

Because ARC units are maintained at a high state of training readiness, have a high content of prior service personnel, and their personnel serve many more man-days on average than reservists in other Service reserve components, it is perhaps not surprising that Air Force reserve units can integrate quickly and easily into the active force structure. In practice, they are probably more like full-time than part-time airmen. If the reserve forces in the other Services made the same commitments of time and resources, it is likely that any current problems of integrating reserve units into the active force structure would be reduced; however, the question is whether it would be cost effective for the Department of Defense to provide the required resources.

It would appear that the Army and the Marine Corps treat their RC elements in a roughly similar fashion. Both Services expect to use reserve units in support of active operations in wartime, and each has a flexible planning system for mobilizing the required units when authority is given to access the RC. One difference is that the Army has so much of its support structure in the RC that most major operations, including peacetime contingencies, now require employment of reserve units. The Marines plan to call up reserve units only for

major conflicts. Hence, both Services are capable of relying on reserve units as the requirement arises, provided that involuntary call-ups are authorized. The Army has also encountered situations where there are needs for reserve capabilities but no authority for involuntary call-up. In the few cases we reviewed of Army use of volunteers in peacetime contingency operations, small numbers were demanded and there was lead time to prepare and coordinate the activity. In practice, this implies that where active Army units are not available, required capabilities in the RC will be involuntarily called to active duty for participation in peacetime operations—as has been done recently for both Haiti and Bosnia.

Other Cultural Considerations

This section has so far dealt with comparative aspects of Service cultures relevant to Service internal decisionmaking processes in responding to capability requests. There are two further relevant areas. First, jointness in planning and operations adds a dimension that can both challenge and reinforce the Services' separate cultures. Second, there are differing degrees of tension in the interstices between active and reserve components within each of the Services that have important consequences for their relationships well beyond operational capabilities for peacetime operations.

Influence of Joint Assignments

With regard to jointness, it should first be noted that while there are joint commands, joint task forces, joint staffs, joint billets, and joint assignments, there are no joint careers. The influential Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the importance of joint experience in both operations and planning, especially for senior officers, but stopped well short of creating a joint staff officer corps with a separate identity from the Services. Unlike some foreign nations, the United States has shied away from creating a special uniformed power center above the Services, preferring instead to chart a course of increasing the degree of cooperation and integration between the existing Services in all areas where interaction between them is required or desired. This means that most joint planners and joint commanders are Service members serving a tour of duty in a joint billet fully expecting a return to a Service-specific assignment after the joint tour is ended.

A central purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to ensure that each Service becomes enriched by the infusion of joint duty experience. One aspect of this is that every high-level planner and commander in the separate Services is very

likely to have worked in a joint setting.¹⁴ Clearly, this can be of enormous benefit in many of the interactions among various agents and institutions discussed earlier in Sections 3 and 4: communications can flow much easier, misunderstandings can be kept to a minimum, and, in many cases, parochialism can be avoided. Joint experience by individuals in critical positions has at least the potential for tempering ingrained Service cultures. For example, an Army planner with joint experience assigned to a joint command staff position may realize that an Air Force Red Horse unit or a Navy Seabee unit is much better suited for a particular task than an Army combat engineer battalion. Joint experience can help to ensure that requisitions for capabilities are assigned to better sources in other Services rather than applying the narrower views developed within a single-Service culture.

It also works the other way. Since every joint billet is filled with an individual from a specific Service, joint planning, decisionmaking, and operations must reflect Service-specific cultures—because that is what each individual brings to the joint table. It is very likely that certain subtle biases in various planning factors are introduced that may have a bearing on which Service is assigned a particular task or on which particular capability within a Service is tapped for some specific operation. Our research did not focus on this area, but it is nevertheless reasonable to expect that specific Service cultures may limit the choices considered at the joint level. The joint planning process provides ample opportunities for the joint commander and senior staff officers to ensure that all relevant factors and alternatives are considered in the planning and that any vestiges of Service-specific cultural biases are contained.

In this context, the question arises whether a joint commander should be expected to consider RC capabilities as early as the planning process. The implied argument is that unless the considerations of the RC surface early in the planning of an operation, a bias has already been introduced in favor of sourcing a capability from the active component; in other words, there may be an implicit impediment to the use of reserve units by the very manner in which joint planning is undertaken.

In our visits to six different unified and specified commands, an explicit complaint was brought forward by RC representatives who complained that,

¹⁴This does not mean that every such officer has had the responsibility for making or even influencing decisions that have had joint implications. Even in a joint billet, an officer may represent his/her Service background, expertise, and perspective. The infusion of jointness in an individual (if there is any, it does not always work as hoped for) in such cases comes from osmosis in a setting where separate Service members are forced to interact for a common purpose rather than from actual integration of actions taken by the Services or the joint command.

although their function was to advise the joint commander on reserve issues, they were excluded from the planning undertaken by the command staff. The alleged result was that RC capabilities received incomplete consideration for important missions. Yet in repeated discussions at every command we visited, the consistent response we received was that joint planners do not consciously tilt any planning factor either in favor of or in bias against RC capabilities.

As specified in the planning and decision processes laid out in the preceding two sections of this report, joint planners consider only issues related to operational task requirements and what specific Service capabilities exist that best match those requirements. Joint planners uniformly stated their view that any decision about sourcing a capability, AC or RC, was exclusively the prerogative of the Services, usually through their component commands, and that the joint command was absolutely neutral on that issue. The only consideration for a joint commander, in their opinion, is to find the needed capability, and if it is in the RC, then there would be no second-guessing of a Service decision. Our conclusion is that, insofar as any cultural biases exist at the joint planning level, they are much more likely to have a bearing on sourcing requests *between Services* than on how a Service-specific requirement is sourced *between Service components*.

Component Relationships

This conclusion then leads to the final element relating to Service cultures on which we wish to comment: the intra-Service relationship between active and reserve components. We have discussed quantifiable differences between the Services; clearly, other qualitative aspects may also be relevant and may even lie at the heart of the quantifiable aspects we have discussed. It seems clear that these complex cultural and institutional relationships are the principal factors that determine the use of the RC in peacetime contingency operations.

Our overall conclusion is that the degree to which RC perspectives are reflected in the planning process differs both by the Service and by the joint command under consideration. A further overall observation would be that, while there are certain systemic cultural aspects to the influence of reserve perspectives on planning and sourcing decisions within each Service, the manner in which reserve perspectives are brought to bear on joint issues is highly idiosyncratic and therefore may vary widely between joint commands.

In our visits to the various joint commands, we spoke with representatives of the component commands assigned to each unified command. In general, we found a high level of integration of RC representatives in the Air Force, with some variations between regional commands. At USAFE, representatives from both

ANG and AFRES at the O-6 level were present at planning sessions in support of European Command (EUCOM) missions.¹⁵ We observed a similar close working relationship between active planners and reserve component personnel at Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base.¹⁶ In these cases it was clear that RC personnel present the particular viewpoints of the reserve community.

These instances stand in some contrast to what we observed during other visits and in other Services. In several places, we found that RC personnel were participating as integral staff members for the planning and execution of various peacetime operations, working alongside active personnel and performing qualitatively similar functions. Thus, for example, at USAREUR we met staff officers from the RC who performed planning functions but whose duties did not include representing the particular viewpoint of the RC as it may relate to special capabilities or restrictions. It is likely that, when such considerations have a bearing on planning or execution of an operation, members of the RC join in the discussion without a formal tasking. However, outside of the Air Force, we did not find that the views of the RC were explicitly solicited by formally charging RC representatives with this task. From the small sample represented by our visits, it seems that the Navy and the Marine Corps approach this issue very much like the Army—if there are RC members on the joint or component commands, they usually have responsibilities that closely parallel those of active members, and are not formally expected to represent RC concerns and expertise. Implicitly, this means that active personnel in most cases are assumed to have the requisite knowledge on all RC issues.

The degree to which this is a satisfactory arrangement depends on different factors. For instance, in the Navy it may be that the only relevant RC issue is how to find the right skill and grade mix of the needed augmentees. In the Air Force, the routine and ubiquitous use of the ARC may obviate the need for any special RC expertise on the joint staff. Lacking authority to directly access the RC, the most important function of a RC representative at a joint command may be to assess the potential to rapidly find the requisite number of volunteers from the reserves. In the case of the Marine Corps, many active officers have worked directly with the RC. The only reserve issues that may arise would pertain to accessibility and readiness of units, and these are closely monitored at the highest levels of the organization. In the Army, with more complex and diverse

¹⁵In this capacity, the ANG representative could bring the special capabilities of the C-130 models with air defense systems to the attention of planners. Early in the UN operation in Bosnia, this capability existed only in the RC, a rare case of the RC owning a capability superior to that of the active component.

¹⁶Air Combat Command (ACC) has a broad range of responsibilities that includes functioning as the Air Force component command for U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).

capabilities and a larger proportion of the force in the RC, a greater depth and breadth of knowledge on the staffs of joint commands may be needed.

Conclusion

This section has provided a broad-ranging discussion of what we call the cultural aspects of the relationship between the active and reserve components. We have noted certain of the most significant quantitative and qualitative manifestations of these relations to illustrate the importance of cultural values and attitudes as they demonstrate clear differences among the Services. In certain instances, they account for tensions within the Services.

As with all cultures, the cultural issues addressed here appear to be deeply embedded in the institutions concerned. They cannot be changed by outsiders precisely because they are so much a part of the value system that they become a part of every member of each Service. Only the leadership can affect them, and probably then only over a period of time. Hence, we make no strong recommendations that would suggest drastic changes to the existing cultures. We also doubt that even if significant budgetary resources were given to the Services to spend on improving the use of the RC, it is unlikely that these cultures would be quickly or easily changed.

The case for change must therefore be based on creating an atmosphere in which cooperation and integration can be spawned over a period of years. We recommend certain process improvements that would foster a higher likelihood that RC be considered earlier in the planning process than currently seems to be the case. These recommendations do not represent fundamental changes, only a step toward increased coordination and cooperation.

6. Alternative Force Options to Improve Responsiveness to Peacetime Contingency Operations

This section examines the question of whether force mix changes could improve the ability of the United States to respond to peacetime contingency operations. Obviously, one way of increasing responsiveness is to increase the size of the total force, with specific units that are organized, funded, and trained exclusively for OOTW missions. However, our current military strategy is to size and train our military forces for major regional conflicts, assuming that "lesser" types of missions can be accomplished by the resulting conflict force structure. Therefore, we examine only options that hold constant the current size of the total force and that do not organize units for the conduct of OOTW.

We discuss two options. One option is to realign units and capabilities between the active and reserve forces. Any unit "swaps" between the two components of the force must be carefully examined. Since RC personnel are generally only part-time, RC units typically have lower annual costs than comparable AC units. Therefore, moving different types of units between the two components must be accomplished in a manner that results in little or no change in total operating cost of either component regardless of changes in component end strengths.¹

A second option for increasing the responsiveness to peacetime contingencies is to obtain needed functional capabilities from the civilian sector in lieu of using reserve capabilities. For several recent peacetime contingency operations, civilian contractors have provided support capabilities such as transportation, laundry, food preparation, minor construction, and other logistics functions.² This option is comparable in many ways to increasing the size of the military force by adding units specifically organized and trained for peacetime contingencies, especially if they are undertaken on a frequent basis. The advantage of civilian contractors is that they can be called upon (and funded), as needed, as opposed to being a permanent part of the military force structure.

¹For instance, in the recent past the United States has been involved in as many as five peacetime contingencies, all requiring medical support. Because the vast majority of the deployable medical structure is in the Army reserve, the AC may not have the robustness in its medical assets to meet the full range of missions. It may rely too heavily on the reserve medical structure in peacetime.

²John Mintz, "Outsourcing Goes Right to the Front," *The Washington Post*, December 21, 1995, p. B13; USARCENT briefing, March 1995.

This section first describes how two variables, the frequency of U.S. involvement in OOTW and the probability of an MRC, affect the likelihood of employing RC units in a peacetime contingency force package. It then examines, within the boundaries of the options specified above, how functional capabilities could be redistributed or augmented to improve our ability to conduct these missions. Criteria for evaluating the options include responsiveness, accessibility, funding, and the potential impact of hostilities. Based on these evaluations, we draw conclusions about how the options affect the use of reserves in OOTW missions.

Likelihood of Using RC Units for OOTW Missions

As we have discussed in the previous sections, a number of factors result in an institutional bias on the part of some Services and force providers to use active component units for peacetime contingency missions. Concerns surrounding responsiveness, accessibility, and cost, in addition to the influence of the overall Service cultures, all contribute to decisions that result in peacetime contingency forces typically composed of primarily active component units. However, situations can arise in which other interrelated circumstances overcome these biases.

The likelihood of the Services and force providers choosing RC units for an OOTW mission can be affected by at least two variables—the frequency of U.S. involvement in OOTW and the probability of a MRC occurring. The general relationship between these two variables and the RC content of a peacetime contingency force is shown in Figure 6.1.

Much of the current interest in using the RC in OOTW arises from the concern that our increased involvement in such missions can have a detrimental effect on AC personnel and the readiness of active units. If we rarely undertook peacetime contingency missions (low demand), the Services and force providers would probably always use active component units.³ Assuming these OOTW missions could provide realistic training that would benefit the readiness of the active forces for MRCs, the choice of active forces is reinforced. But over the past several years, the United States has responded militarily to many more peacetime international situations than in the past, and the duration of such missions has been increasing.

³Of course, for those functional capabilities that are assigned only or largely in the RC, there may be no choice but to employ those RC units as a portion of the forces used in many peacetime overseas contingencies. This accounts for the area near the origin in Figure 6.1 showing RC involvement even with few OOTW and low likelihood of MRCs.

RAND MR796-6.1




Figure 6.1—RC Content of Forces Deployed in OOTW

With the drawdown in the active component force structure, the fewer remaining AC units have been asked to do more (lower supply); in some cases the same unit is assigned to multiple OOTW missions in a short span of time.⁴ Unit commanders are concerned that the increased involvement in peacetime missions affects both the readiness of the unit to perform its MRC mission and the morale of its personnel, which may in turn negatively affect retention. Thus, the more U.S. peacetime deployments in a given period of time, the greater the potential negative impact on the readiness of AC units and the higher the likelihood that RC units will be assigned to such missions.

Involvement in peacetime contingency missions may adversely affect a unit's ability to perform its MRC mission. When the probability of an MRC is very low, readiness is not as much of a concern as when there is a strong likelihood that U.S. forces will be involved in a major combat operation. As the probability of an MRC increases, the Services and force providers are more concerned with the

⁴For example, the Army's 10th Mountain Division had elements employed first in Somalia and then in Haiti without much time for rest and retraining between these operations.

readiness of their “first-to-fight” units. They may restrict AC or RC availability and use later deploying units, often in the RC, for OOTW missions.

Overall demand is the primary reason for considering RC units for peacetime contingency operations. If the actual demands of OOTW missions or the impending demand of an MRC are low, the Services and force providers will lean toward the use of AC units for peacetime contingency operations. When the demand is high, caused by either actual OOTW or the effects on availability of impending MRCs, the likelihood for using RC units in peacetime contingencies increases.

Criteria for Assessing Location of Capabilities Among Components

The magnitude of the actual or impending demand tilts the Services and the force providers toward using either active or reserve component units. However, as we have described in previous sections, the choice of which component to draw from is also affected by where in the total force the needed capabilities reside. We have listed those types of tasks common to many peacetime contingency operations and the functional capabilities (types of units) required to accomplish them. We also discussed how some of these functional capabilities reside exclusively or predominately in the RC. For those tasks, the Services and force providers typically must rely on RC units.

The various criteria and conditions at the time of a contingency operation can have opposing effects on whether the Services and the force providers select AC or RC units for an OOTW mission. The question we are addressing is whether force structure changes can reduce or eliminate these opposing effects and increase the ability of the total military to respond to OOTW. To answer this question, we examine the effect on the decision criteria of potential force structure changes.

Responsiveness

When a peacetime contingency operation requires a timely response, some RC units may not be candidates. By design, most RC units cannot deploy on short notice. Time is required to contact unit personnel, assemble personnel and equipment, complete necessary mobilization actions, and perhaps conduct additional training. As discussed previously, the responsiveness of RC personnel and units cause greater problems in some branches of the military Service than in others. Due to a combination of organization, policies, and funding, the Air

Reserve Component (ARC) has typically been able to respond in a timely manner to peacetime contingency missions. It is generally much more difficult, however, for the RC of the other Services to provide a quick response.

Active component units of all the Services, on the other hand, can respond quickly, especially if the units are forward deployed in the theater where the OOTW mission will take place. Given their frequent use in recent peacetime OOTW missions, it appears that the civilian contractors are prepared and can respond quickly once the mission commander has been granted permission to use nonmilitary capabilities and contracts have been negotiated.

The ability to respond in a timely fashion to an OOTW can be adversely affected if the needed capability resides primarily in the RC, a situation that tends to occur more frequently in the Army than in the other Services. To overcome this limitation, functional capabilities could be spread more evenly between the AC and RC, although this is not always feasible or even preferred. Certain types of units, such as civil affairs, rely primarily on civilian skills and training, such as for commercial electrical power and sanitation engineers. The military often has difficulty providing the necessary training or maintaining the skills once the personnel are trained. Also, the distribution of a Service's functional capabilities is determined in large part by the timing of the needs for those capabilities during an MRC. Those capabilities that are initially required for an MRC are typically placed in the AC, while those capabilities that are not in the initial forces for an MRC are placed in the RC.

Accessibility

The problem of responsiveness can be compounded by difficulty in accessing RC units and personnel. By law, the RC may be used for a peacetime contingency operation only if members volunteer or if involuntary authorities are invoked, such as a PSRC, that allows for recall or mobilization of the reserve forces. Again, through organization, funding, policies, and supporting cultures, some Services have an easier time gaining access to RC units and capabilities than other Services.

The active component, given its "full-time" nature, is readily accessible for any type of mission. Civilian contractors may also be easy to access if funding is available to meet their price. Accessibility concerns would argue for a more even distribution among the two components of those functional capabilities that are needed in peacetime contingencies and now reside primarily in the RC. The difficulties mentioned above, however, may make such a redistribution of some functional capabilities infeasible.

Cost and Assurance of Funding

Active component personnel are paid on a full-time basis whether or not they participate in particular peacetime contingencies. From that perspective, their manpower costs are sunk and not additive. The associated operational costs can be assumed to remain fixed regardless of which component is employed. The use of reserve component personnel, and certainly contractors, in OOTW typically result in an increased manpower cost throughout the duration of the mission. If a Service, such as the Air Force, earmarks part of its budget for additional RC training days or support for active operations, those funds, if unused when needed, might offset limited RC participation in peacetime contingencies. However, unless active manpower is fully consumed in other operations or does not possess the needed skills, additional manpower funds must be made available to pay RC personnel and contractors, requiring the Service to redistribute funds in its existing budget or to obtain supplemental funds from Congress.

From a total cost perspective, using manpower from AC units will almost always cost less than using added RC manpower. Further, the use of RC manpower typically appears to cost less than civilian contractors. The cost implication for changing the current force structure mix is to argue for shifting those capabilities that are frequently needed for peacetime contingencies, but are primarily assigned to the RC, into the active component.

Risk of Potential Hostilities

Although the level of potential hostilities may influence the types of forces employed in a peacetime contingency, it is expected that active forces will be employed without regard to the threat. Reserve forces are maintained to conduct the same missions as the active force in conflict or peacetime and can be expected to do so when directed. However, the potential for hostilities may influence the availability of volunteers and civilian contractors. Once RC volunteers have been obtained, they perform assigned tasks regardless of the threat in the same manner as active personnel. Contractor personnel may not be held to the same standard during periods of hostility, regardless of contractual agreements. This fact is recognized when commanders assess the potential for use of contractor capabilities and may limit their exposure in peacetime operations within hostile environments. The hostilities factor favors having needed contingency capabilities within the active forces.

Impact of Alternatives on Use of Reserves in OOTW Missions

Based on the various evaluation criteria, any military force structure changes that would improve the ability to respond to and conduct OOTW missions would shift certain functional capabilities from the RC to the AC. The impact would, in most situations, be a decreased reliance on RC forces. Where and when civilian capabilities should be used to increase responsiveness must be based on the specific operation.

When the frequency of peacetime contingency operations and the probability of an MRC is low, AC units will be the forces of choice if they have the needed capability. When the frequency of involvement in OOTW or the likelihood of an MRC increases, the Services and the force providers will pursue alternative sources for the needed capabilities. In many cases, the RC will be the preferred alternative. However, if the needed capability does not reside in the RC, or if the RC can not be accessed or respond in a timely manner, civilian contractors may be the preferred option, although civilian contractors typically result in a higher (often much higher) cost than using military capabilities and may not be available as needed during periods of hostility. While the tradeoffs in the advantages and disadvantages must be weighed for each particular situation, contingencies will generally favor the continued use of active forces, and this seems to conform with defense policies on the basis for sizing the active military components.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Potential for Using Reserves in OOTW Missions

We have analyzed the potential for using the RC in peacetime contingency operations based upon a demand versus supply relationship and considered the factors that shape and integrate the forces selected for employment. It appears that the RC have the capabilities needed to accomplish many of the tasks commonly associated with these peacetime missions and are competent to perform them. Various operational, institutional, and resource factors can impede the use of RC forces when the demand for forces raises the issue of RC participation. Easing these constraints may facilitate using the RC in the face of demand, but these changes will not increase the operational demand.

Recognizing this central axiom, we summarize the factors, identified within our analytic framework, that are potential impediments to the selection or use of reserves in peacetime contingencies.

Summary of Impediments to Using Reserves in OOTW

In general, the joint crisis action planning process does not directly consider how capabilities are to be obtained, but the manner in which some of the operational planning factors are applied limits appreciation of RC capabilities. Unified commands and their staffs are primarily concerned with identifying the needed capabilities to force providers, whether a supporting unified command or a Service component command. Usually Service component commands, in both the supported or other force provider commands, focus on capabilities needed to respond to the tasks of a peacetime contingency operation. These Service force providers make RC sourcing decisions based upon a force selection decision process that uses criteria shaped by institutional and resource factors related to their respective Service cultures. These Service cultures are appropriately biased to employ the active, full-time, forces first. Furthermore, these cultures differ significantly across the four military Services.

The planning factors discussed in Section 3 shape the demand for operational capabilities. The required capabilities and forces for a peacetime contingency

operation may be found in the RC but may not be used if active forces are available and the contingent nature of the operation requires a rapid response. However, other operational factors may require capabilities that are found only or largely in the RC, which enhances the likelihood of RC employment in such operations. For example, lengthy operations tend to provide opportunities for RC forces because they increase the demand for backfill and, later, rotation of active forces.

At the unified commands, the sourcing of mission capabilities is largely a choice of which Service has the appropriate assets, with the Service-specific force providers subsequently deciding the components of needed forces. However, it is worth repeating that from the perspective of the staffs of the unified commands, there have been no reported adverse operational impacts caused by any of the impediments to accessing the RC for peacetime contingency operations cited in this report.

The force selection decision process discussed in Section 4 describes the method and criteria used by various force providers to determine the source of supply for needed capabilities and forces. Review of these criteria indicates that availability and responsiveness generally favor the active forces. The rather recent advent of early planning consideration of and decisions to employ nonmilitary sources for needed capabilities in contingencies, often at high cost, seems to preempt further consideration of RC forces. The accessibility, public support, and mission importance criteria are of concern only if volunteer reserves are to be sought. Obtaining volunteers may be impeded by the complex and differing Service RC orders and funding processes.

Of all these criteria, the lack of and inability to locate Service funding was the most often cited impediment to the use of RC volunteers. This again may be attributed to cultural bias—to include programming and allocation of resources.

Service cultures affect the use of the RC in peacetime contingencies and are indicative of the broader institutional and resource biases imbedded in the Services. Attempts to remove Service impediments to the use of reserves in peacetime operations may be inappropriate, since the institutions conform to the general intent of national defense policy—to use the full-time active force whenever possible so as not to incur the added costs of an expanded force, particularly for peacetime operations, either routine or contingency.

Of potential significance is the combined impact of a smaller defense force and the increasing frequency of U.S. involvement in peacetime contingency operations. This combination may have uneven influences on the demands for the RC within each of the military Services. The operational and institutional

factors particularly affect the Army, which has a higher potential for increased employment in larger numbers and for longer durations than the other Services. Last, the increased reliance on volunteers in some peacetime operations has not yet received universal acceptance from all the unified commands or Services.

Finally, we discussed a range of options for improving the military capability to conduct peacetime contingency operations. Although each Service has differing considerations, moving selected capabilities out of the RC and into the active force would in general improve overall responsiveness to contingencies. Such a move would lessen the reliance on RC forces in peacetime contingencies. In certain functional areas, such as civil affairs, this alternative may be impractical since development and retention of these skills does not easily conform to an active military career. Alternatively, we found nonmilitary or contract civilian capabilities to be a viable, but often more costly and operationally restricted, substitute for RC capabilities. However, in cases where RC participation must rely solely on volunteers, contract civilian capabilities may be more politically attractive regardless of their cost. Generally, we found that changes in the force mix to improve peacetime contingency capabilities did not favor increased use of the RC.

Recommended Actions

Our recommendations to remove impediments to RC use in peacetime contingencies address the three aspects in our analytic framework: the planning process at the combatant commands; the force selection decision process at the Service force provider commands; and institutional and resource aspects of the Service cultures in the military departments. Many of these recommendations require added resources or the reallocation of existing defense or Service resources. Others affect policies, administrative procedures, and processes. In all cases, we discussed with appropriate staff members the feasibility of implementing our recommendations, but we did not attempt to determine implementation costs.

Recommended Changes to Improve the Planning Process

The keys to removing or reducing planning impediments to the use of the RC in peacetime contingencies seem to lie in increased staff knowledge of RC capabilities and limitations, broader consideration of RC use early in the planning process, and enhanced involvement of full-time RC members in key staff elements. Specific recommendations are:

- Explicitly anticipate operational tasks that are well suited for or require the use of the RC, such as backfill and rotation of forces, in the planning process and consider using RC units from the outset. Often these tasks are the subject of follow-on planning for subsequent phases of an operation and delay consideration of needed RC capabilities.
- Challenge routine assumptions made about accessibility, urgency, threat, and duration of an operation that could limit the use of RC forces and routinely adopt alternative assumptions during the planning process. This recommendation is intended to eliminate unintentional limitations to RC use.
- Make available to unified command level planners more information on RC capabilities and limitations and ensure it is given early consideration in the development of the concept of operations. Planners should recognize the implications of providing a capability from the RC.
- Improve organizational and communications interfaces between commands so that staff planners have information on RC capabilities, accessibility, and limitations.
- Increase the numbers of full-time RC staff members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) available to serve on unified and Service component command staffs in operational planning organizations. Where possible, this should be done with additional RC full-time support (FTS) but based upon validated staffing needs. IMAs are a pool of knowledgeable volunteers that can expand unified staff resources during peacetime contingencies, and their numbers could be increased.
- Ensure that planning peacetime contingencies does not exclude key RC staff personnel. Compartmented planning must include RC staff personnel knowledgeable in capabilities and limitations.
- Extend the deliberate planning process to develop standing organizational linkages with selected RC units, without requiring complete Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), that are identified as potential sources for regional concept plans (CONPLANS) for future contingency capabilities (the Army's civil affairs organizational affiliation seems an appropriate model for this purpose). Coordination with these RC units during planning would also assist in early identification of needed RC volunteers.

Recommended Changes to Improve the Force Selection Decision Process

Aspects of accessibility, responsiveness, and the comparative evaluation of needed capabilities with civilian contractor sources can ameliorate impediments to RC use. Implementation of these recommendations requires authority within the purview of Congress, DoD, and the military Services.

- Clarify, make visible, and administratively link the various internal Service mechanisms that provide funding and orders to active duty for reserve volunteers. Assigning responsibilities for funding and issuing orders to a single entity in those Service commands that identify and match RC volunteers to operational requirements will improve responsiveness and respond to the concerns of RC volunteers.
- Request authority from Congress to fund a DoD-level RC personnel contingency account to support reserve volunteers for use in peacetime contingency operations. Annual funds in the amount of \$25–30 million appropriated exclusively for the use of RC volunteers in operational contingencies and allocated by OSD, with unused amounts returned automatically to the treasury, would seem sufficient to ensure needed reserve manpower without the need for reprogramming internal Service funds needed for other operations. The funds in the RC personnel contingency account should be in addition to existing Service programmed funds for use of RC personnel to support routine AC peacetime operations (See Table 5.5) and Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Reserve Affairs funding of CINC RC personnel for peacetime support.
- Identify and link selected RC units and potential volunteers with high-demand requirements in emerging theater regional CONPLANS for quicker response times in peacetime contingency operations. Early designation of specific RC units to respond to peacetime contingencies in selected theaters reduces planning times and improves coordination.¹
- Require cost analysis comparisons between similar RC and recent civilian contracted capabilities as a basis for policy guidance. Determine if a cost consideration needs to be added to planning and if the reserves are a competitive option to civilian contracting.

¹An example is found in the FORSCOM and USARC standing list of medical reserve volunteers for peacetime contingencies during a specific year. This allows planning to be based upon known assets for a given time period.

Recommended Changes to Remove Institutional Impediments

These recommendations address actions that the individual military Services could implement as demands require.

- Assign higher readiness levels and resources to selected RC units that have capabilities in high demand in recurring peacetime contingency operations. This will allow for pre-operational identification and improved responsiveness. Post-mobilization activities could be completed prior to mobilization and sustained with the added resources. The intended purpose is to ensure the selected RC units have essential resources to allow for rapid deployment.
- Increase the full-time support for selected RC units that have skills and capabilities often sought by soliciting individual volunteers for peacetime contingencies. This is intended to expand the pool of potential RC volunteers in specific skills and realize benefits similar to the current Air Force process where full-time reserve members, with no conflicts with civilian employers, often volunteer for peacetime overseas deployments.
- Review existing mobilization policies and plans to change existing priorities for the use of various sources of RC forces and volunteers to improve support for peacetime operational contingencies. The intent is to ensure that the Services have policies that reflect the current national strategy and operational environment and that sourcing priorities are appropriately established.

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